Archives

How India rebuilt its relations with the U.S. after the 1998 Nuclear Tests

Exclusive interview by Sheela Bhatt
with Naresh Chandra, former Indian Ambassador to U.S., India Abroad (Part 1 - October 25, 2002; Part 2 - November 1, 2002)

In 1992, then Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao assigned handling of America, visiting American leaders and America-related issues not to the Americas desk at the External Affairs Ministry, but to Cabinet Secretary Naresh Chandra.

Chandra became Rao's unofficial advisor on America. Thus, before he arrived in Washington, DC in April 1996 as India's Ambassador to the United States, the veteran civil servant knew all the major American players involved with South Asia.

Born on August 1, 1934, he joined the Indian Administrative Service in 1956. He credits his posting as District Magistrate in the cities of Uttar Pradesh between 1958 and 1965 as "solid grounding", which gave him "hard common sense." Between 1981 and 1984 he served as advisor to the Sri Lanka government on export policy, finance and policy administration.

He became India's Defense Secretary in 1989. Along with then Defense Minister K.C. Pant, his visit to the U.S. gave him an insight into American defense issues. He was appointed Home Secretary in 1994 and soon after Cabinet Secretary, head of the Indian Administrative Service.

Some observers believe he was better than most professional diplomats during his tenure in Washington between April 1996 and February 2001, a five year stint marked by India's contentious nuclear tests, the subsequent U.S. sanctions, and the even more surprising rapprochement in which Chandra played a stellar part.

In this, his first major interview after he stepped down as Ambassador, he provides INDIA ABROAD an exclusive glimpse of how India won the United States over, after being almost treated like a pariah post-the Pokhran nuclear tests.

Part 1

Q. Could you give us an inside view of how you handled the situation in Washington after India's May 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran? What kind of diplomacy did you practice in dealing with the Americans?

A. I had a good team and I had good support from Delhi so we were able to overcome a difficult situation. The fact is I and all other ambassadors were taken by surprise on the morning of May 11, 1998. I was woken up by Information Minister [at the Indian Embassy in Washington, Shiv Shankar] Mukherjee. He saw the news on CNN. We saw the news before the American officials saw it on CNN, which did create problems.

We knew it was coming. On my visit to Delhi I knew the government led by Prime Minister [Atal Bihari] Vajpayee was going to do it, but we did not know the date. In that sense it was a surprise. The Americans were completely taken by surprise.

In 1996, we had differences over CTBT [the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]. But before Pokhran, relations were on the mend. Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering and I had detailed discussions on starting a strategic dialogue; [that] the U.S. must recognize India's role as a big player in Asia. We wanted to discuss everything including the environment, NATO, US-Russia relations, US-China relations, to which they had agreed.

The Indo-US strategic dialogue started as equals. It was going great; we decided it should be at the Foreign Secretary-level. That was always the idea. Foreign Service consultations between India and the U.S. are the traditional and effective mechanism. [K] Raghunath, [then] India's Foreign Secretary, and Pickering had several rounds; one was held on May 1, 1998 in Washington where India's nuclear policy was also discussed.

Obviously, none of us including Raghunath knew the blasts were coming on May 11. Though at the May 1 meeting, we made it clear that our [nuclear] options are clear and we retain it.

Q. What did India mean by that?

A. India's option to conduct nuclear tests has survived for twenty-four years. But when it happened on May 11, American officials took it very hard. They felt let down. They went on to say they were deceived. There was a loss of credibility. There was a bit of mistrust between India and the U.S.

For the next couple of weeks the Administration went into high gear to persuade [then Pakistan Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif not to follow suit. We knew Pakistan was going to do it. But that period was most uncomfortable. As a very strong posture of U.S. foreign policy, Pakistan was applauded and India was denigrated. We decided to deal with the matter at all levels - in Congress, in the think tanks, in both print and television media. We went to whoever was willing to listen and there were plenty because a lot of interest had been aroused in India.

My day post-Pokhran used to begin at six in the morning with an appearance on the breakfast shows, then to one office to another, to one studio to another. The day used to end with CNN International's late night news show.

Q. How did you go about diplomatically?

A. I wrote a letter to the State Department and communicated the Government of India's statement and suggested that we were ready for discussions and available at short notice. We left it at that. I advised my officers not to seek an appointment til we were called, because I knew that for a few days our request would be snubbed. Why take a snub? Also, our idea was to sit out and see what Pakistan did. In the meantime U.S. delegations were going to Islamabad.

[Then Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbott himself led a very strong delegation to stop them [Pakistan] from exploding [a nuclear bomb], the U.S. virtually pleaded with Pakistan - all this is known history. [Then President Bill] Clinton called Nawaz Sharif who was dubbed a friend. The media wrote about how close Clinton and Sharif were. Later, he [Sharif] was dumped.

Basically, the U.S. offered Pakistan lots of money, tremendous help in India-Pakistan contacts. But Sharif, egged on by the army, thought it would be too heavy a political price to pay not to demonstrate Pakistan's nuclear capability.

As far as India was concerned, we knew these guys had tested a nuclear device of Chinese origin. For them it was like taking it out from underground storage, putting it on a shaft and blowing it up. There was nothing else to do. That is why they were able to do it so quickly. We were patient with the officials in Washington. We had to explain things to them.

Q. How did the first meeting with them go?

A. We had a big meeting May 12 where they were sitting with Vajpayee's statement and a letter that they later leaked [to the media] in Washington because it had a reference to China.

The most difficult thing was the U.S. officials were asking us: "Please tell us, are you going to test some more?" We had received no phone calls from Delhi. The [Government of India] statements had mentioned a 'series of limited number of tests' and so on, but the number was not specified.

The important thing May 12 was to prevent the U.S. government from issuing an order imposing sanctions because, if they imposed sanctions on May 12 and if we conducted a nuclear test on subsequent days - as we did May 13 - then what could they do more? In that case they would have needed additional, stringent sanctions.

May 12 we kept them engaged. President Clinton was flying to Europe. He was in touch with Tom Pickering who was conveying requests to us, asking whether we would stop testing and whether we would agree to sign the CTBT in which case he would try and avoid imposing sanctions against India.

Since there was no question of our subscribing to the CTBT and it was already past midnight in New Delhi, I tried to reach [the Indian government] on the phone but I don't think it was possible to make a connection that day. May 13, another blast took place. It was a surprise that it came so soon. In one sense it helped because it came before the U.S. issued the order of sanctions. That quickly led to an announcement by President Clinton in Berlin about the imposition of sanctions against India.

The administration went into high gear to show that we had let them down and we had concealed our program from them. They went to the extent of using the word 'deception'. I thought this was one thing, which we would have to deal with, strongly and quickly.

Q. What was your thrust? How did you present India's case?

A. We wanted to dispel the impression that India was a jingoistic military power. The first thing we did was to quickly accept an invitation to appear on C-Span. They conducted an hour long interview. I got a chance to explain the troubled security scenario around India, why it was necessary to test our nuclear weapons. I also explained that the government of India was not a Hindu nationalist jingoistic government as the press was making it out to be.

Every government, which preceded the present government, I said, had kept the nuclear option alive, funded it, encouraged scientists and built up the organizations; that these tests could not be performed in a few weeks.

Q. Who supported India?

A. On the morning of May 13 there was a friendly phone call from Henry Kissinger. I explained to him the background. He said he was going to Europe but on his return he would sit with me and do an article after listening to India's point of view. I found that he agreed with me that India had a troubled neighborhood and that India needed to show that its nuclear deterrents was credible and effective. Many people thought our nuclear program was on artificial life support for many years.

On his way to the airport, Dr. Kissinger called the CNN news desk and was put on the air immediately. He said, "The Indians must have known what U.S. law is and that the President has no option but to impose sanctions under the thrust of Congressional law". Then he went on to say, "India lives in a troubled neighborhood. They have to take care of their national security concerns, which are pretty grim at the moment." If he were in Atal Bihari Vajpayee's place he would have done the same thing, Dr. Kissinger said. His views on CNN gave the opposite point of view with much greater force than any Indian diplomat or minister could have achieved.

His word counts in Republican circles. After hearing this, others felt encouraged. President Jimmy Carter made another statement and we had both Republican and Democratic support. I thought it best to deal with Congress and get across information.

In the House of Representatives as well as the Senate, I knew who the Chairmen of the Intelligence Committees were. Senator Richard C. Shelby was Chairman of the Senate Committee and Congressman Porter Goss was Chairman of the House Committee. Both gentlemen were very open. President of the Republican National Committee Jim Nicholson gave more or less our point of view. He said, "The Administration should have known that it was in the Bharatiya Janata Party's manifesto. We have not taken India's security concerns on board."

I told both Chairmen frankly that no country tells everybody when they are going to test. Only superpowers made such announcements.

The Soviet Union and the United States could make such announcements because they could. Nobody could do anything about it. They conducted thousands of nuclear tests, some informed and some not informed. The Chairmen agreed with our views. The CIA and State Department had been investigating what really happened.

The same evening, Senator Shelby went on CNN and said their enquiry showed that [the Administration's view that India had committed] 'deceit' is not correct. I requested Goss again. In the lobby of the Capitol he collected a few reporters and gave a similar statement that put things at rest. Places like the Brookings Institution started helping out. Richard Haass wrote a balanced article. Stephen Solarz and lots of Indian American experts like Sumit Ganguly were also in a state of shock for a few days, but they were very supportive and did a lot of ground work.

Q. What were the problem areas in presenting India's case post-Pokhran?

A. The biggest obstacle was that the Administration did not want India's case to be accepted. At that time they were committed to CTBT, they felt that India had severely damaged the U.S.' nonproliferation program. From that point of view, they had to counteract everything that India did. Indian policy didn't suit their global policy. So they went hammer and tongs at India.

I wish some [Indian] ambassadors were kept informed [ahead of the nuclear tests]. I mean no criticism of the government, but not ringing us after even the press got the news was difficult. Somebody in Delhi should have realized that it is past midnight in America. When they were telling the press at least somebody should have called the ambassadors. If they had called us in the night itself I would have woken up [then National Security Advisor] Sandy Berger, Talbott, Pickering. They were humiliated when they were informed [of India's nuclear tests] by their secretaries that CNN is saying this. They were aghast.

Karl Inderfurth, then Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, told me his secretary came running and asked him, 'Sir, do you know what has happened?' Inderfurth replied, 'You must be joking. Is it CNN or some comedy show?'

I think this was unnecessary.

That showed a degree of insensitivity that took us lots of time to recovery from.

After the initial blast, the media started printing our side of the story. The NEW YORK TIMES and the WASHINGTON POST printed our side more and more. I was interviewed and quoted like hell including my direct criticism of [then] Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She had gone on record to say that the Indians have dug themselves into a hole and they have frittered away the legacy of Gandhi and Nehru and so one. I had to reply. Slowly, things changed and we were able to arrange the meeting between Jaswant Singh-ji and then Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.

Jaswant Singh-ji was Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission at that time. I sent word and an informal request to the Administration. They asked, 'Is the Government of India making a formal request?' I said, 'Don't make heavy weather out of it.' They agreed and the first meeting took place with Talbott. Since we diplomats are just paid vakils [lawyers] of the Government of India and not members of the BJP, he could do things that we could not.

With his demeanor, presentation and arguments, he was able to dispel the myth that was created about the BJP and the government of India. He came out extremely well. Within an hour of their first meeting, Talbott and Jaswant Singh-ji were on the same wavelength. It was the first time we could see a thaw in American officialdom.

We could convince them that we have a government that they could do business with and there was more to India than the nuclear tests.

They were insisting on benchmarks - getting India into the nonproliferation regime. In the ten or eleventh rounds of talks we had with them, they were insisting on the NPT. These rounds were the best form of discussion - free, fair and on a realistic plane. I sat in on each one of them. Jaswant Singh-ji's talks turned the corner in a political context.

Part 2

Last week Naresh Chandra, India's Ambassador to the United States, revealed to INDIA ABROAD Senior Editor Sheela Bhatt in an exclusive interview how New Delhi began the process of rebuilding its relationship with the United States, ruptured after the 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran.

In the concluding segment of his first interview after demitting office in February 2001, the man credited with helping improve India's ties with the U.S. discusses the future of the Indo-US relationship.

Q. Which lobby worked in India's favor in Washington after the nuclear tests?

A. All the people we interacted with were firmly furthering the U.S. interests. Nobody - whether they are Congressmen or Senators or any other American lobbyist - would knowingly ever help any other country to the detriment of American objectives. But some Americans believed India had a strong case, that India having a nuclear program was not to the detriment of the U.S. and that India did not threaten U.S. interests. And that a strong India - feeling confident in terms of its military, security and defense concerns - was a plus point for stability and harmony and therefore good for the U.S., the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

After being convinced of this, they made moves, which were helpful. As I told you before [India Abroad - October 25, 2002], the people who countered the propaganda against India were [former Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger, [former National Security Advisor Zbigniew] Brzesinski, Jimmy Carter ... even the Dalai Lama gave helpful statements. The Dalai Lama has lots of influence on a few Congressmen.

The people who tried to understand and engage us were Senator Richard Lugar, Senator Paul Sarbin, Senator Connie Mack. Among Congressmen, Frank Pallone, Sherrod Brown, Nancy Pelosi and the Chairman of the India Caucus Gary Ackerman. He was very annoyed in the beginning because he felt his task had become difficult.

Congressman Benjamin Gilman, then Chairman of the International Relations Committee, too helped. Those who were not ready to accept India's need for nuclear tests were Senator Jesse Helms, Senator John Kyle, Senator Trent Lott and a few other Congressmen who didn't understand Indian concepts.

Q. What about the diplomats?

A. Officials cannot be segregated, they are all professionals. But in improving relations a key role has to be assigned to [then Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbott, very ably assisted by [then Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs] Karl Inderfurth. I think his handling of the South Asia Bureau was the best. People who showed common sense and had a very practical approach were National Security Advisor Sandy Berger.

Q. Has India played its cards well after 9/11?

A. Yeah, yeah. I feel U.S. policy would have been the same, irrespective of our diplomacy. Period. Too much faith in diplomacy or in lobbying is very foolish. That also shows you don't have a good case. Diplomacy is not irrelevant, but it is not decisive. Despite all the blundering I am absolutely certain that India and the U.S. will keep coming closer and closer. But history has a cruel way of delaying things. If the Indian economy grows at a good rate, U.S. interest in India will remain high. If we are able to avoid communal disturbances our stock will remain high. We just have to live up to the Constitution of India and we are through.

Q. During Jaswant Singh's tenure as External Affairs Minister, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Congress alleged that American influence was more visible in India than before, American diplomats are now openly going to Kashmir to talk to separatist leaders. How do you view that perception?

A. I am worried about the level of apprehension in India. We give long lectures to Americans about talking to Iran. On Iraq we express different views. On CTBT we were along and still shouting at the U.S. So what's the problem? How many Americans are coming here [to India]? I feel more should come. If we have just ten Americans here we start feeling apprehensive. We have ten thousand Indians working at NASA and they don't have fears.

You can't have it both ways. This is not a reflection of our diplomacy or what's happening. It's a reflection of the actual state of affairs in terms of who is more powerful. Of course, they are more powerful. What's the problem? If we behave in this fashion how do you deal with Nepal or Bangladesh? Their politicians say the same thing about India and we feel very bad.

The problem does not lie in American diplomats. The problem lies in the fact that in every field they are more powerful than you are. So change it! By not meeting them, will you become more powerful? It is a sign of immaturity as a nation when we show nervousness when diplomats visit us. That guy will come and try to influence us and will go back. Why should he influence you? And why are you not able to influence him? Then we should shut down our missions and build a Great Wall of China all around us and live in peace like a frog in a well.

Americans will come, we will have to learn to live with them and deal with them.

In Indira Gandhi's time, they came in fewer numbers. How did it help us? Fewer they come, more F-16s would go to Pakistan. If they don't come here, they don't understand you. And if they go often to Pakistan, they become friendly with them.

I thoroughly reject the theory that American big brother diplomats are coming and influencing us. Take your mind back. President [Linden Baines] Johnson pressurized India when he gave us PL480 aid. Do you know what was the pressure? The pressure was to take money out of heavy industry into agriculture.

They were here in the hundreds. They were all saying 'bring about the green revolution.'

Advice from outside does not mean that it is bad. We are giving advice to Nepal in harvesting water for hydraulic power. We are advising Bangladesh to exploit its oil reserves. They are saying exactly the same thing about Indians what people here say about the Americans. I have faith in the Indian people and politicians that they can handle American diplomats. There is no problem.

Our guys should deal with them on equal terms; but not dealing with them is a self-defeating thing. We want to be a member of the Security Council and we are afraid to receive American officials in New Delhi! People will laugh. Such a cowardly nation - how can it deserve to be a permanent member of the Security Council! We have to behave confidently. America will see American interests, we should see ours. If you are suspicious then the game is over. You have to push your case and be vigilant. We should say we will act in India's interest.

Q. How did Indian Americans contribute in presenting India's case?

A. They were very helpful. They did a wonderful job in contacting Congressmen and Senators in their area. In America the interface for contacts and engagements is vast and varied. Indian American activity will be a plus point in the years to come. But we should not overuse it. No Indians or groups of Indian immigrants should be seen as agents of India.

We should realize it is a two-way process. The State Department knows the influence of Indian Americans. If we can use Indian Americans with the U.S. Administration, believe me the State Department will use them to influence the Government of India. That is why the Administration and the President keeps praising them [the Indian American community] to the skies.

They are appreciated not for their achievements alone. They [Americans] also appreciate the funding they get from rich Indian Americans. But they are also alert to the influence Indian Americans exercise on the Government of India.

You go to any function and the State Department will always keep praising Indian Americans. I'm not casting aspersions. But as professionals they are used.

Q. What should be our focus in Indo-US relations?

A. We have to remember that it is not the decision of men that is going to determine the trends of Indo-US relations. It depends on what kind of people both of us are, the way our economy is going, the way we take decisions and the way we govern our country. These are inexorably driving both countries into more and more convergence. All that individual players and actors can do is either hasten this process marginally or distract and interrupt it from time to time.

I said it in 1996 and I'm saying it now - India and the U.S. coming closer and closer together is inherent in the logic of history. It will happen. These are the only two large nations which are not homogeneous. We are heterogeneous.

There is not one America; the same is true in India. Every manner of public opinion you will find there. Tolerant and fundamentalist - we have it all. But there is strength in diversity.

In such a situation in the long run you have to be cool, and in the short run you have to be vigilant.