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The Clinton Visit and After: A View from the U.S.

Presentation made to SAPRA (Security and Political Risk Analysis) at the India International Center in New Delhi, India by Ram Narayanan
April 29, 2000

I have been asked to present a US viewpoint on President Clinton's visit to India -- how the US has taken the visit, what has changed, and what we can do to make things better between the two countries in the context of India's security needs.

The President's visit has been described as historic. I would consider this a fact, not a cliché. While in India, the President said the right things, made the right moves, announced the right initiatives and visited the right places. Perhaps the most important contribution of the Clinton visit is the establishment of a climate of trust between the leaders and the bureaucrats of the US and India. At the people-level, there has never been a problem, while business opinion has been steadily swinging in favor of India with the opening up of the Indian economy. But among the bureaucrats -- yes, there has been a problem. The post-Kargil developments and this visit, hopefully, will help sweep away the cobwebs of distrust, particularly among the middle-level bureaucrats in both the countries -- a relic of the Cold War days.

President Clinton's visit has sent a strong signal to the U.S. Congress and the next President that the US must enhance the quality and range of its relationship with India - and take it to a higher plane.

The most significant document produced by the visit, undoubtedly, is the Vision Statement signed on March 21 in New Delhi by Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Clinton. Its full title is "India-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century". I think there is every chance of this becoming a dynamic living document -- a road map for the future. It not only sets out in clear terms a vision for US-India Relations for the 21st century, but backs it up with a concrete action program for institutionalizing the dialogue between the two nations.

Two important outcomes of the trip from India's viewpoint are: firstly, American recognition at the highest level of the fact that India has real security concerns and, second, what I would consider a categorical declaration of American support for the integrity of the nation of India.

Peter Jennings of ABC News had asked President Clinton a question: So what is America's Kashmir policy?

President Clinton's response was that U.S. policy is, first, respect the line of control. Second, do not promote violence by third parties in Kashmir. Third, negotiate. And, fourth India should not seek a military solution to Kashmir's problems. The Kashmiris deserve to have their concerns addressed on the merits. But he added, and I quote: "I don't think we ought to get in the position of saying that we think that an ethnically diverse country like India can't exist anymore. I don't agree with that."

I would underline that last part of the President's response. The U.S. should not put itself in the position of saying an ethnically diverse country like India cannot exist. To my mind, this is the nearest thing to a declaration of support for the Indian viewpoint in Kashmir.

Opinion in the Congress, the media, the think-tanks and academic circles has been moving in India's favor ever since Kargil. This trend has gained momentum. However, American press and TV reporting on India during the Clinton visit was less than we would have hoped, mainly because it had to compete with another important event occurring at the same time - the Pope's historic visit to the Holy Land. Also, in the early stages, the American media tended to focus on the nuclear issue, India-Pakistan relations, and India's weaknesses like poverty and illiteracy. Some sections of the media and some members of the Republican Party labeled the Clinton mission a failure judging it from the narrow perspective of India not appending its signature to the CTBT. There was also some controversy about the cost of the trip.

Toward the latter part of the trip, however, there was some focus on economic issues including India's capabilities in information technology. And, immediately following the visit, excellent articles appeared in major U.S. newspapers by experts like Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Professor Amos Perlmutter of the American University and Editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies. Both supported India's decision to declare itself as a nuclear weapons state.

I observe that the main difference in US media coverage of India today, compared with the past, is that, while the negative images have not been discarded, the positives are now outweighing the negatives. And that's a tremendous gain.

If I may share a not-so-well-kept secret, America has a free press - yes - but American media, including the newspapers, often take their cue from the bureaucrats in Washington. If the bureaucrats are favorably disposed toward India, the media tends to reflect the same position. If in the past, the media had been portraying too much of the negatives, it was mainly because the bureaucrats had very little positive to say or "leak out" about India. That situation has changed.

The new image of India is catching on - that of an emerging economic power and the home of dot.com gurus. And we Indians in India, as well as Indian-Americans and friends of India in the US, need to build this up. This new image of India will only gain further momentum as the economic reform process in India moves forward and the US-India relationship increases in depth.

Michael Moran of MSNBC included a foreign policy survey in his Internet column, Brave New World, soon after the Clinton visit (http://www.msnbc.com/modules/SURVEYS/BraveNwld_040500.asp). He sent me the results and his observations:

Some 5,000 people, he said, took the survey, presumably at least 4/5s of them would have been Americans.

One of the questions asked: Should the United States seek to strengthen ties to India to counter China's influence in Asia?

• 30% Yes, it's an obvious counterbalance and a long overdue support for India's democracy.
• 47% Yes, but the United States should also seek to mediate the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.
• 12% No, not until India renounced the use of nuclear weapons and de-nuclearizes its missiles.
• 10% No, Pakistan was America's friend during the Cold War and should not be abandoned in a time of need.

In his comments to me, Michael Moran said that Pakistan and India have never been the center of American consciousness, obviously. But the answer to this question indicates Kashmir is now on the map for many in the U.S. That's a sea change, and he doesn't think it's completely to do with the nuclear testing of '98. Moran believes, and I agree, that there is a fairly substantial shift away from the idea that Americans should support despotic or unstable regimes for the sake of relatively marginal national interests. India's claim on Kashmir, or even the threat of nuclear war between Pakistan and India, would be defined by most Americans as an important issue, but not a vital interest of the United States.

China, however, has rightly or wrongly been placed at the center of the American foreign policy agenda. That has created a renewed awareness of a whole host of regional issues in South, Southeast and North Asia. It wasn't long ago that serious support for pulling out of South Korea existed in the US Congress, for instance. Today, that is unthinkable. Similarly, the Taiwan issue has gone from the pet peeve of right-wing gadflies to a central plank in Republican foreign policy thinking.

Moran believes the same dynamic is at work in South Asia, amplified by India's democratic system and its new embrace of something approaching capitalism.

I have been asking myself, in specific terms, what can and should we Indian Americans do to ensure that US-India friendship becomes, in President Clinton's words, "too important to ever fall into disrepair again".

I have been looking at various models of international friendship such as that between the United States and Britain, the US and France, and the US and the European Union.

The US-British model, I feel is not appropriate for India because Britain looks too subservient. US-France is okay, except that France sometimes appears to be carrying some needless baggage. US-European Union seems to me to be the model for US-India to emulate. It's a dignified relationship in which there is a tremendous amount of cooperation, and where differences are handled, by and large, without rancor.

Cooperation between the US and India must necessarily be built on the strong positive political and economic ties that make them, in the words of Prime Minister Vajpayee, "natural allies". That's the area we have to focus on to get the two nations into a closer relationship.

And, progressively, I hope, the Pakistan factor will play less and less of a role in our endeavor.

Let me focus a little more on the vision document, which is extremely comprehensive and which, as I said, is going to be our road map for the next many years. The two leaders agreed on a number of steps to intensify and institutionalize the dialogue between America and India, so that regardless who is elected the next President of the United States, the process will continue.

These steps include:

• Regular bilateral summits.
• Regular meetings of senior government officials to discuss a broad range of issues, including security and nonproliferation.
• Regular meetings of the Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism to share information and intensify cooperation.
• Institutionalization of bilateral economic dialogue through a high level coordinating group.
• A US-India Financial and Economic Forum hosted by the US Secretary of the Treasury and the Indian Finance Minister.
• US-India Commercial Dialogue led by the US Secretary of Commerce and India's Minister of Commerce & Industry to deepen ties between American and Indian business communities.
• US-India Working Group on Trade to enhance cooperation on trade policy, including issues relating to WTO, with the involvement of the private sector.
• Joint Consultative Group on Clean Energy and Environment, which will emphasize collaborative projects, clean energy technologies, private and public sector investment and cooperation, climate change and other environmental issues.
• US-India Science and Technology Forum to promote research and development and the transfer of technology.
• A commitment to dialogue in other mutually agreed upon areas.

Arising from the vision document and India's security concerns, which are an ever-present issue, we need to prioritize exactly what Indian-Americans need to focus on in the next few months. What we should convey to our lawmakers in Washington, the media, the think-tanks and academic circles, and, of course the White House and the various Departments of the US government.

In order to achieve effective results - to create a real impact - and this is a point I would like to highlight - it's very important for Indian-Americans to look at matters from a US viewpoint. To what extent can we project Indian concerns as US concerns too? There lies the recipe for success. As an American, I wouldn't disagree with Professor Brahma Chellaney's assessment of the Clinton visit. He says that "America is doing what it has always been doing: assertively promoting its interests. America's interests today demand closer engagement with India."

The crucial point is that America's and India's interests happily coincide on most issues today and the few that have caused some differences are manageable. President Clinton himself expressed the hope that the two countries will wind up in a common position.

We need to fine-tune the issues that Indian-Americans need to pursue:

First, the Vision Statement and Action Program or "architecture" that goes with it, to institutionalize dialogue between the US and India. How do we make sure on our part that the vision is realized? Here are some thoughts:

1. Indian-Americans will have to work through the political process in America on a nonpartisan basis. First, we must provide our lawmakers a briefing on the Vision Statement, emphasizing its positive benefits to the United States and US-India ties. Then we have to follow up and ask our House Representatives and Senators to give us a checklist of what has so far been accomplished regarding the Action Items.

2. Likewise, Indian-Americans will have to be in touch with the officials in the White House, the National Security Council and the State Department who will be responsible for coordinating the action programs. We should pin them down to specifics. Make them give a timetable for action on the numerous US-India agreements. An American expert on India, who spent two years in the bureaucracy, told me that they hate doing it. But, if there is enough political pressure behind it, they will act. So, it's important to keep our Senators and House Reps informed.

3. Indian-Americans have already developed strong ties with both the Presidential candidates. They now need to get Governor Bush/Vice President Gore to commit publicly to the Vision Statement. Governor Bush has shown interest in India. In a major foreign policy address last November, he referred to India as a rising great power and called for the United States to pay far more attention to that country. I haven't so far seen any similar statement from Vice President Gore. But I assume that as the Presidential campaigns gain momentum an appropriate statement will be forthcoming from him as well. Those Indian-Americans working for the Gore campaign should ensure that this is done. We also need to persuade the two Presidential candidates to visit India, before the elections, as they do some other friendly countries and allies.

   In speaking with the candidates, we should avoid the Pakistani factor as far as possible. The last thing we want is to get into a counterproductive struggle with the Pakistani-American community. The US-India relationship can grow, as can the US-Pakistani, once democracy is reestablished in that country. Our interests are vastly different. There is no need to assume a zero sum game.

4. Here is a suggestion: Six months from now, let's hold an "Implementation" Conference or Workshop both in the US and in India to assess the progress on the Action Items within the Vision Statement. There are enough corporations involved on both sides, as well as prosperous Indian Americans, to fund a six-monthly review. Perhaps the first such "Implementation" Conference or Workshop could be set for sometime during the latter part of November/first half of December 2000. By that time, the US will have elected its next President. So, the Conference or Workshop can review the progress made during the final months of the Clinton presidency, and set the agenda for the first six months of the new administration.

Let me look at a few other important issues:

First, we need to create more opportunities for US lawmakers to visit India, to see at first hand democracy in action at the village-level which so impressed President Clinton. Can we get a 100 US lawmakers to visit India in the next couple of years?

Also, I expect a big movement forward in US-India economic cooperation. While the larger US corporations take care of their interests effectively through the US-India Business Council and other forums, there is inadequate attention to what India can offer the medium and smaller-sized US companies. Many US firms have know-how and expertise which could benefit India, but consider India too tough to navigate. Indian-Americans should start talking to their Congresspersons about specific sectoral opportunities. The object is to look at the issues from a US perspective to trigger active interest and encourage smaller companies to look seriously at the Indian market. Such an initiative could well see more visits by business delegations to India led by Congresspersons. Hopefully over a period, the results would be a spectacular growth in investment and trade, along with greater interaction between the smaller guys in both the countries.

Regarding the Sanctions, the CTBT and the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) issues: John Holum, President Clinton's Senior Adviser for Arms Control recently said that there can be no development of US-India relations to its full potential, in spite of the Presidential visit, until India joins the NPT. That India's signature on the CTBT and the proposed convention to cut off further production of missile materials will be viewed only as the first step. His exact words: "Until it does so, the strong US sanctions against India will persist". My understanding is that up till now the US has been insisting on India joining the CTBT in order to remove the sanctions against World Bank loans, dual use technology and defense cooperation. This looks unreasonable in view of the non-ratification of CTBT by the US Senate and the fact that India, like the United States, has solemnly affirmed its policy decision not to perform any more nuclear tests. Removal of the sanctions regime, therefore, should be an action item in the Indian-American agenda.

The NPT is a different kettle of fish. India is unlikely to ever support the NPT in its present form. So, will the remaining sanctions in regard to export of nuclear technology and really sophisticated super computers from the US to India remain for ever? Signing of CTBT will bring us back to the pre-May 98 situation. But what we need is an end to technology denial.

As to permanent membership in the Security Council, there has been no open reference to American support of India. But, the U.S. Ambassador to India has made a statement that the US will consider India's claim for permanent membership. Do we pursue this matter aggressively?

That brings me to another point. Many members of the US Congress are unhappy that in the past India has voted against the US on many issues coming up in the United Nations. The Goodling Amendment, fortunately defeated in the House of Representatives last July, would have prohibited foreign military assistance (but not humanitarian aid or developmental assistance) to countries (like India) which failed to support the U.S. at least 25% of the time in the U.N. General Assembly. Now that the US and India see eye-to eye on most issues, and with increased interaction, hopefully, the voting patterns of the two countries in the UN will be more in alignment and India will be spared of this type of embarrassment in the future.

The Chinese threat. In a recent hearing on Tibet, the Republican Chairman of the House of Representatives' International Relations Committee, Benjamin Gilman, spoke about the threat to India from Chinese missiles stationed in Tibet. And many Americans have begun to realize that China is likely to be a major threat to their own security and vital interests in the course of this century. The U S is, therefore, likely to deploy both a national missile defense as a shield against intercontinental ballistic missiles and a theatre missile defense in East Asia to protect the region against shorter-range missiles. In a recent article in the International Herald Tribune, Professor Brahma Chellaney argued in favor of India becoming part of the US-led theatre missile defense system to protect itself against Chinese short-range missiles and intermediate range missiles with nuclear warheads stationed in Tibet. If that happens, it will cut the costs for India in deterring the Chinese missile might. He added, "In a world of rapid change, it's now conceivable to think of a future India with its own nuclear force but under a US strategic defense umbrella". This, of course, presupposes US acceptance of India's need for a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. My question: What's India's official view on the subject of becoming part of the US-led theatre missile defense system?

Of course, the ideal deal would be to persuade China to dismantle its nuclear missiles stationed in Tibet and to completely stop exporting nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan. But that looks like asking for the moon!

Once, there is clarity on this issue, Indian-Americans need to formulate an action strategy to get the US and India working on the right solution.

Regarding Defense Cooperation, this is one area not mentioned at all in the Vision statement. With the progress of the Singh-Talbott talks on security issues, and if, as President Clinton hopes, the US and India end up in a common position, and sanctions against military cooperation are completely withdrawn, I assume this area will receive attention. An American friend who is a specialist on defense issues, with whom I have some correspondence, feels there are wonderful opportunities to be gained in the military area. He has made some specific recommendations:

1. Continue expanding the dialogue between the two nation's military organizations in countering terrorism. A permanent intelligence sharing infrastructure and counter-terrorism committee (including civilian and military leadership) could be supplemented by regular exercises between the two nations. This recommendation has been partly implemented by the setting up of the Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism. But my friend suggests we "think outside the box". Wouldn't a joint terrorism response force be a noteworthy goal for the two nations to strive for?

2. Further expand "military to military contacts". Representative initiatives may include increasing the number of military officers deputed to U.S. War Colleges and vice versa.

3. Initiate regular exercises between the military units. For example, exercises in humanitarian relief operations could be conducted annually on a bilateral basis. As these "confidence building" measures increase the quality and range of cooperation between the two countries, the militaries should be challenged to expand the peacetime operations to another area - perhaps peacekeeping exercises.

4. Splendid opportunities exist for the Navies of the two nations. The frequency of "at sea search and rescue" exercises, and other "low intensity" exercises could be expanded between the two nations to a semiannual or quarterly basis. These may take advantage of the operational schedules of the two Navies, where for example, a US Navy squadron transiting to the Arabian Gulf from the Mediterranean Sea, could rendezvous with an Indian group at an agreed upon location.

How can we coordinate Indian American activity, at the grassroots level, and build a powerful and influential movement for US-India friendship?

Let me tell you something about the website I host and coordinate. It's called the Lobby for India [US-India Friendship.net] Resource for Indian Americans and Friends of India. Notwithstanding the nomenclature, we are not a lobbying organization. We are not even an organization! The term lobby is used in the dictionary sense of "influencing opinion". It is a not-for-profit, all-in-one resource Indian-Americans and friends of India can turn to for information on current issues relevant to US-India relations.

It tracks the voting record of the members of the US Congress on issues of importance to the people of India. It has the full texts of press releases of US Congresspersons on issues relating to India. It reproduces verbatim transcripts of hearings on India-related issues in the US Congress. It provides guidance on matters requiring positive action by U.S. Congresspersons to strengthen America-India friendship and cooperation. It includes direct links to current, relevant news stories and articles in online editions of Indian and U.S. publications. And, it provides tools for building mainstream American opinion in favor of India.

Most important, Lobby for India website makes it easy for the ordinary Indian American to actively participate in contributing to the development of an ongoing, strong bond between the US and India, literally by just clicking a few buttons. He or she need not invest time in researching information - its all there.

The resource essentially complements the excellent efforts made by all the major Indian American organizations, individuals, and groups to promote and deepen US-India friendship. In no way does the website or the activities it generates compete with any Indian American organization. Its focus is to serve as a vehicle of information and facilitation which all Indian-Americans and friends of India can draw upon.

The e-mail list for the action alerts that we send out periodically to Indian-Americans is now approaching 4000 nationwide, which you will agree is not a bad record for the first ten month period of its existence. And this number is growing fairly fast - at the rate of approximately 200 per week.

The way I look at it, this is a committed non-official diplomatic corp of Indian Americans and friends of India in the service of the American people and the Indian people. We are engaged in what may be called "Track II Diplomacy" -- not as busybodies, but as genuinely interested in building up and deepening US-India partnership in its diverse manifestations.

Eventually we hope to have a network of people throughout the country, in each of the 435 U.S. Congressional Districts, who have established relations with every member of Congress and their appropriate staffers. Our goal is 10,000 committed, non-official "diplomats" by the end of 2000. And then, to bring in not just Indian Americans, but all Americans who can support the mutual objectives of the U.S. and India - some 25,000 to 30,000 by the end of the year 2001.

Just imagine, what such a powerful force of highly educated and knowledgeable Indian-American and American "diplomats" will be able to accomplish for the good of the US and the good of India. What influence we will have on mainstream US thinking with the overriding message that it's good for America to seek, as the Vajpayee-Clinton vision statement says, "a natural partnership of shared endeavors" with India! Thank you.