Congressional Hearings/Resolutions

Regional Security in South Asia

Panel II of a hearing of the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee

October 20, 1999

Representative Doug Bereuter (R-NE), Chair

Witnesses:

• Teresita Schaffer
  Center for Strategic & International Studies
• Selig Harrison
  Woodrow Wilson Institute

REP. BEREUTER: I'd like now to call the second panel. We have two distinguished witnesses, and we'll hear from them in order. First, Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, director of South Asia, Center for Strategic & International Studies, CSIS, and Mr. Selig F. Harrison, senior scholar, Woodrow Wilson Institute, fellow, Century Foundation. I have provided more detailed biographical material on these two people at the beginning of the hearing. I want to thankboth of them for their patience and for being with us today.

As with the first panel, your entire statements will be made a part of the record, and you may proceed as you wish. Ambassador Schaffer, please proceed. Thank you very much.

MS. SCHAFFER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm delighted to have this opportunity to testify before your subcommittee. In years past, when I was in the State Department and testified before your predecessor, I always wondered what happened when the government witnesses finished, breathed their sighs of relief, and sped out the door. And I finally have a chance to find out.

REP. BEREUTER: Well, generally it's not quite so late in the day. I apologize for that fact.

MS. SCHAFFER: I would like to make some brief observations on the dramatic developments in Pakistan in the past week and then to share my recommendations about U.S. policy priorities for the region.

First, Pakistan, and a disappointing end to a disappointing government. Pakistan has lived under a stressed and seriously flawed democracy for the past 11 years. Each of the four changes of government since 1988 involved serious charges of corruption and abuse of power.

Assistant Secretary Inderfurth touched on the country's systemic problems -- corroded national institutions, pervasive corruption, sectarian strife and urban violence, and a crisis in the government's finances. He might also have mentioned that long-term social problems like high population growth and widespread illiteracy have gone untended, victims of bad priorities and of the government's cash crunch.

The one that worries me most is the disaffection in Pakistan's smaller provinces at what they consider to be domination by the larger Punjab. As much as a year ago, many Pakistanis were ruefully concluding that the democratic government couldn't deliver the goods, or at least this democratic government couldn't deliver the goods.

This explains why the Pakistanis in the main greeted last week's coup with relief rather than outrage. And that, in many ways, is the saddest commentary on last week's events. Pakistan's prior experience with army regimes suggests that, beyond a brief honeymoon period, they have a bad effect on both the army and the country. We are right to call for a restoration of democratic government in Pakistan. In the final analysis, that is the only way that a government can acquire the legitimacy the country craves.

Furthermore, all the problems that we've been talking about need to have their solutions enshrined in representative institutions. In particular, the dangerously frayed relations among the provinces cannot be put right without a genuine political process, real elections, and an accountable parliament in which people of all four provinces find their voice.

But if democracy is an absolutely vital goal, I would argue it is not the only one. Ultimately, Pakistan needs not just an elected government. We've had four examples of how they didn't succeed. They need one that can deliver the goods.

How should the United States respond to this situation? I believe that our basic principle should be to judge the regime in Pakistan by its actions. The burden of proof is now on General Musharraf to show that he is actually fulfilling the agenda he's sketched out. We should watch in particular two areas: First, reestablishing decent and accountable governance, as he promised in his speech last Sunday. And this is something which an appointed government, in fact, can do, or can make a big beginning towards doing.

The second thing we should watch is management of relations with India. The army high command, as Mr. Inderfurth told you, did initiate the dangerous Kargil adventure, and therefore they bear a large measure of responsibility for the current downward spiral in relations. They're also in a unique position to reverse it if they choose to do so.

The announcement of the thin-out of forces along the international border is a useful olive branch. Stopping infiltration across the line of control in Kashmir would be a good next step. And in this respect, Mr. Inderfurth talked about getting a commitment to that effect. I'm not particularly interested in the commitment. I'm interested in seeing what happens. Commitments are cheap. It's the action that's important.

If the current leadership meets these high standards, and if it then moves swiftly back to the barracks, America's democratic values and its strategic interests could both come out ahead. History does not leave one very optimistic, but we should watch what actually happens.

For the duration of this military government, current law rules out most aid, and military sales and a high-profile political embrace would seem to be quite out of place. That is a fitting response to the overthrow of an elected government, but I agree with Mr. Inderfurth that we need to remain in close touch, including a serious military-to-military policy dialogue. If the new government is able to meet IMF conditions, as their predecessors did not, I also see no reason for us to prevent international institutions from funding financial stabilization and related programs.

I would also like to leave you five brief thoughts about American policy in the rest of the region. First, the U.S. should encourage India and Pakistan to find a real settlement to their differences, but to recognize that the work of settling has to be done by those countries. I oppose naming a special envoy on Kashmir. The administration is right to conclude that a third-party role can only be effective if both countries accept it.

While it is up to India and Pakistan to work out the terms of the settlement, both need to come to terms with some unpleasant realities.

For Pakistan, this means recognizing that they're not going to get Kashmir and that they may need to build a political consensus around a solution that doesn't significantly change today's map.

For India, the difficult reality is that they really have to allow self-rule for the valley of Kashmir, a much larger measure of autonomy, and hands off what passes for a political process there, which has been badly distorted for the last 50 years. Otherwise they face the nasty cycle of insurgency and repression.

My second point is that the U.S. should reexamine its non-proliferation priorities. I fully support the goal of CTBT signature by India and Pakistan, and indeed, I hope that the Senate will in time reconsider its action rejecting U.S. ratification of the CTBT. But to me, there are two issues that are more important to the nuclear safety of the world.

The first is avoiding nuclear conflict, and the second is preventing export of nuclear materials or know-how from India and Pakistan. To me, the Kargil episode demonstrated two things; one, that India and Pakistan really don't want a nuclear confrontation, and two, that it would be easy to slip into one by accident. This makes a compelling case for increasing the margin of safety through risk reduction measures between those two.

As for exports, both India and Pakistan have declared that they will not export the products from their programs. And as far as anyone knows, they have not done so. Strengthening this resolve, formalizing it and sharing information on its implementation are critical to ensuring that unintended leakage doesn't occur. These are the things that are important if you're worried about the nuclear wannabes.

Third point: I think we should delink India and Pakistan policy wherever possible. Clearly the military regime in Pakistan will inhibit major U.S. policy initiatives there. There's no need to subject relations with India to the same inhibitions. Waiving sanctions on India makes sense even if Pakistan is now going to be under new sanctions. Developments in Pakistan should not lead the president to cancel his plans to visit South Asia. A visit to India and Bangladesh could still serve U.S. interests.

Fourth point: In much of the region, the greatest potential lies in economics. This is especially true in India, where the economic reforms launched in 1991 are beginning to bear fruit. The existing level of economic reform has been accepted across the political spectrum, and I think we can expect more action now that there's a government in place with a somewhat longer time perspective.

One can also point to similar trends in Bangladesh and in Sri Lanka. We should nurture the economic relationships both by encouraging trade and investment and by continuing our aid program. The one in Sri Lanka in particular has taken a beating during the last few years of cuts in the aid budget.

My final suggestion is don't (latch?) the rest of the region to India and Pakistan. Both the administration and Congress rightly devote most of their South Asia energy to India and Pakistan. However, I would urge both this committee and the administration to reserve a little air time for the rest of the region. Their political and economic health is not determined by India's and Pakistan's troubles. They offer smaller but still attractive markets for American business.

It doesn't take a huge effort and it doesn't take a huge amount of time to tend our relations with these countries, and this can contribute to healthier regional relationships, which in turn can even provide a better context for India and Pakistan to manage their problems.

In closing, I would like to reinforce the plea I know you have received from Mr. Inderfurth and others for more generous funding of the nation's diplomatic business. Taken all together, the U.S. government's international affairs budget is less than 1 percent of the total budget, but look at what you get for that 1 percent. I look on it as a vaccination against the international scourges of chaos and war.

When diplomacy is working properly, you don't see it in action and everyone wonders what the fuss is about. But when it breaks down or when America's diplomats do not have the tools to do the job properly, the world and the U.S. taxpayer pay the price. In South Asia, we are coasting on the accumulated political capital of half a century of patient work. But funding has been drastically cut for the tools that helped build relationships in the past: Economic aid, public diplomacy, international visitor grants, military education and training, and indeed, diplomatic establishments.

The size of the diplomatic establishments has shrunk, and they don't have the state-of-the-art communications they need to mitigate that loss. I think that a properly staffed and equipped diplomatic presence in the region is an inexpensive way to ensure that we're providing the attention it needs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. BEREUTER: Ambassador Schaffer, thank you for your excellent statement. I think it's straightforward. It actually, I think, helps not to be part of the administration to make such a statement. And they certainly do not have state-of-the-art communications; you're absolutely right about that. They know it, too. It's a matter of --

MS. SCHAFFER: Oh, I know.

REP. BEREUTER: -- finding the funds.

Mr. Harrison, we look forward to hearing your testimony. You may proceed as you wish.

MR. HARRISON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief; it's late. I think that it's clear that the advent of General Musharraf's government in Pakistan has exacerbated the tensions between Pakistan and India. Therefore, the point that I would like to stress today is that all grants and sales of military spare parts, components and weapons systems to Pakistan should remain suspended indefinitely.

Now, Secretary Inderfurth reassured us; he said there are no plans or intentions to do that. But I can foresee the present bargaining that's going to go on and discussions that will go on between the United States and the new government in Pakistan, a great danger of slippage on this issue, because General Musharraf, who's trying to project an image of moderation in an effort to grease the way for both economic and military aid, is going to talk about deals, which moves toward what Secretary Inderfurth called civilian, constitutional and democratic government being made in exchange for modifications of the restrictions on particularly the sale of military spare parts. And I think we should be very alert to the need to avoid that.

General Musharraf and his deputy, Lieutenant General Muhammed Aziz, were personally responsible for initiating the Kargil invasion last May that led to a serious military conflict between India and Pakistan. Now, it's welcome that he has unilaterally withdrawn some Pakistani forces from the India-Pakistan international boundary, but, as has been noted before today, that does not extend to Kashmir, which is what would really count.

Indeed, General Musharraf has made clear that Pakistan will continue to sponsor and support insurgent activity in the Indian-administered areas of Kashmir. This policy poses a continued threat to peace and stability in South Asia, and the United States should in no way condone or support it.

I think the United States should seek to promote a settlement of the Kashmir issue. I agree with Secretary Schaffer that the way not to do it is to become directly involved in attempting to mediate, but I think that what the United States can do to promote a settlement of the issue is to declare its support for the line of control as the permanent international boundary.

In the absence of such a clear American position, Pakistan will feel emboldened to continue its present policy of seeking to bleed India in Kashmir through support of insurgent activity. A settlement based on the line of control -- at present the de facto boundary, of course, as the de jure boundary -- should be accompanied by American efforts first to induce both India and Pakistan to increase substantially the degree of autonomy accorded to the areas of Kashmir under their control, and second, to move toward the reduction of military deployments in both Indian and Pakistani areas of Kashmir when cross-border insurgent activity by Pakistan has ceased.

Now, turning to the issues of economic aid policy toward both India and Pakistan, whether and when to resume U.S.-supported multilateral economic assistance to Pakistan should be decided on the basis of economic criteria alone, and in that I agree with what Secretary Schaffer has just said. The IMF has withheld disbursement of the latest pending installment of its bailout package because the previous government failed to meet key economic performance criteria, especially with respect to tax collections.

If the new government is able to meet IMF performance criteria and move credibly toward economic stability, aid disbursements should be resumed. The people of Pakistan should not be the victims of political events beyond their control. And this principle should also be applied to India, where we have imposed sanctions. And at the present time, World Bank loans for power and roads, which directly affect the lives of people in the rural areas, are prohibited.

And I do hope that President Clinton will go to India and Bangladesh early next year, as is being discussed. I doubt very much that the political conditions in Pakistan will permit him to go there. And if he does go, I hope at that time he is able to announce an end to the sanctions that have been imposed over the nuclear issue.

Now for some general comments. We should be clear about what American interests are in South Asia. Our most important interest is to have friendly relations with India, which is eight times bigger than Pakistan and is emerging as a major military and economic power. India will have a big navy that will affect our access to the Indian Ocean and to the South China Sea. India is going to be a nuclear power, so the balance of power in Asia will have both a nuclear India and a nuclear China.

Technologically, India could make an ICBM in not too many years. So it's clearly in the American interest to be on friendly terms, just as it is with China. We lost sight of that, as one of the members pointed out, during the Cold War when we gave Pakistan $4 billion in military hardware and tilted toward Pakistan on Kashmir.

Now we have a chance to get our policy right, and that requires lifting economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan while keeping the lid tight on military transfers. I regret that Brownback II lumped economic and military aid together, because there is a basic difference in how we should be handling these two types of relationships.

In conclusion, the contrast really is very striking between a stable democratic India that has just completed another impressive election and is doing well economically, and an unstable Pakistan with a military dictatorship once again. And it is at this point a dictatorship, when we look at the fact that the courts are not allowed to operate in any way.

This is a totally arbitrary government at the present time. And so we shouldn't -- I was very distressed that Ambassador Milam started talking about how moderate General Musharraf is. This is a situation that is very, very capable of leading to all kinds of arbitrary repression of human rights within a very short period of time.

American interests and American values both dictate that we improve our relations with India while continuing to cooperate with Pakistan in economic development if it is able to get its act together.

I think I'll conclude at that point.

REP. BEREUTER: Thank you very much, both of you. I'd like to now proceed under the five-minute rule, Mr. Hastings. And I will have a chance hopefully to follow up on a couple of questions.

Both of you have indicated, I believe, that if economic criteria are met, then multilateral aid should continue through the IFI, including the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank.

Ambassador, why is it important -- and also, I think Mr. Harrison distinguished, for example, when he critiqued Brownback II, that it combined lifting military sanctions with economic sanctions. So I think it implies that you're supporting economic sanctions being lifted as well. Is that correct?

MR. HARRISON: Not as well. Economic sanctions, not military sanctions.

REP. BEREUTER: I mean as well as Ambassador Schaffer.

MR. HARRISON: Oh, yes, yes.

REP. BEREUTER: Why?

MS. SCHAFFER: Why should economic aid continue from the multilateral institutions?

REP. BEREUTER: Yes.

MS. SCHAFFER: Pakistan is fairly close to economic meltdown, at least in those parts of the economy that touch the government. The crops get better or worse with the weather, but the rest of the economy is in very serious trouble. Industrial production is down. Investment is in the tank. The balance of payments is in desperate shape if the debt rescheduling runs out, which it will without an IMF program. And government revenues have fallen very seriously short of goals because agriculture is untaxed and most of the wealthy manage to evade taxes.

The IMF program is intended to address this problem. It is in no one's interest that the problem gets worse. But it's also very important that the IMF conditions be met, and that's what Nawaz Sharif's government was never able to do. They had trouble with each negotiation. They hadn't concluded the negotiations for the most recent tranche, and the reason they had to conclude it was the IMF didn't believe they were going to do it.

REP. BEREUTER: I follow business affairs there involving some businesses of my own state involved in a big way in Pakistan. And one of the difficulties that continued is the corruption in the government. And the impact that had on Americans' attitude about investment, about construction, about joint development projects is very negative. Is there anything you can say and suggest to do about that?

MS. SCHAFFER: Yeah, I'd like to say two things about that. First of all, General Musharraf has not surprisingly targeted corruption on his short list of things to do. This has been very difficult in other countries because anti-corruption drives so very easily turn into witch hunts. I think it's desperately important that they actually do try to weed out corruption. But in order to do that, I'm afraid they're going to have to catch some of their own people. Human nature alone would dictate that there's at least one general who's strayed from the straight and narrow. And if they do that, they will have credibility. Otherwise, they won't.

My second point has to do with the question of military sales. I would argue that military sales should not take place. I differ with my colleague in that I don't think this needs to be enshrined in law. I think it can be done by policy. And that makes it easier to modify the policy when conditions dictate, which they aren't going to under a military government.

REP. BEREUTER: Well, if the president would sign the DOD bill, he'd have that flexibility.

MS. SCHAFFER: That's -- I'm not in government anymore, sir. I don't have to deal with that. (Laughs.)

REP. BEREUTER: Mr. Harrison, you pointed out that Pakistan is one-eighth the size, some would say one-seventh the size of India. But, of course, it is a very large country in population already, despite -- in comparison with its neighbor. It will be in the seven or eight largest countries in the world in population in 2010, I'm sure, if not already.

They have, as I mentioned, when the secretary was here taking questions, had now military rule for almost half of their existence. And we have commentators questioning whether or not democracy is going to -- American commentators questioning whether democracy is really going to work there, is going to be supported by the people. What are your reactions to the record in Pakistan and what we should expect in the way of an end to military rule?

MR. HARRISON: Neither the civilian nor the military governments in Pakistan have been very successful.

Pakistan started out without a mobilization of its people on a democratic basis when they -- in the period before they were created. India had a freedom movement in which all sections of the population were involved. It had a base for democracy.

Pakistan has been run by the upper crust in the country ever since it was independent. And so, therefore, I don't think prospects for democracy are as hopeful in Pakistan as they are in India. But I do think that military rule is no answer. We have seen that in all the military dictatorships Pakistan has had. They have proved to encourage big-time corruption, big-time drug running, to an even greater extent, I would argue, than the civilian authority. Absolute power does corrupt absolutely.

So I think that we shouldn't expect Pakistani democracy to move in rapid sequence towards anything we would like, but I think that arbitrary rule of the kind that is now being exercised in Islamabad, I think, is going to lead to all kinds of polarization of forces in Pakistan that will make it less stable than ever. This we could go into at great length.

On your previous question, I would like to say that on the question of sanctions, we're not just talking -- I referred specifically to multilateral aid. But the question of economic -- in distinguishing between military and economic sanctions, I had in mind the fact that I would like to see the United States able to have bilateral aid to both India and Pakistan that would help deal with their economic and social problems. And I want to see multilateral aid to India resumed.

I think that the sanctions we imposed after the nuclear tests really made no sense, because it was clear they weren't going to be effective, and so that was simply a missed assessment of the situation and what the consequences would be. The consequences were naturally to force both governments to show that they weren't going to bow to this kind of foreign pressure. So they haven't been effective. They're not going to be effective. All they are doing is preventing the World Bank from making power loans, road loans and other loans that are very important to the economic development and the stability of India. And there are comparable cases in Pakistan of economic development that, if the economic criteria are met, could be profitably extended.

So the time for this punishment for the nuclear tests is over. And it's been proven to be ineffective. It isn't even just. The United States has 10,000 nuclear weapons. The United States isn't doing anything at the global nuclear arms control level to bring China into a whole global process of nuclear arms reductions that would make it less necessary for India to have nuclear weapons. So it doesn't make sense at any level.

And I hope that we are reaching an understanding of that and that the Congress will cooperate with the administration in moving on to a new phase in which we put that behind us, get back to positive economic relations with both India and Pakistan. Pakistan is a big country. That's why I favor an approach toward economic assistance which is separate from our desire to punish the generals who have just taken over.

REP. BEREUTER: Mr. Harrison, thank you very much. I need to move on to my colleague. But I want to say I agree with the gentleman on the imposition of sanctions after the nuclear test. And I do think that was a very common view, a view that you and I share, on Capitol Hill. And I think the administration made a mistake in not recognizing the fact that while those sanctions may have worked to delay nuclear development, ultimately, once both sides had tested, they were no longer productive.

I yield to the gentleman from Florida for his time.

REP. ALCEE HASTINGS (D-FL): I thank the chairman. And I certainly thank both the witnesses for extraordinarily, refreshingly clear testimony. And I echo the chairman's sentiment. I think he will agree that I was one of those that thinks the administration made a mistake with reference to the sanctions. What he said, I reiterate.

Where we are now, though, and in need of your expertise more than ever, is it seems to me when coups take place that the emphasis is on the person that leads the coup. And all of the media attention -- and Mr. Harrison, you were in the media -- focuses on this individual and his or her actions. And there have been more hises than hers out there in the world. Who else in Pakistan, for example, not clandestinely or with any lack of visibility, who else can we talk to? It seems that Benazir Bhutto would be the only person that might have some kind of a national following. Are there others?

MS. SCHAFFER: Is that your question, sir?

REP. HASTINGS: Yes.

MS. SCHAFFER: I think that Benazir Bhutto is going to be a long time before she has a chance to revive her political career. She's out of the country and under indictment for serious and reasonably credible --

REP. HASTINGS: That I understand. But you do agree --

MS. SCHAFFER: -- corruption charges.

REP. HASTINGS: -- that she has a national following.

MS. SCHAFFER: Her party has a national following which she embodies. The Muslim League, Nawaz Sharif's party, is a serious party, although they've got their factions and their internal disputes. Other actors on the political scene tend not to have a national following. There are quite a number of other parties. Indeed, there was a parade of Pakistani opposition politicians who came through Washington in the last couple of months, none of whose parties have done very well at the polls.

One force to watch is the Islamic party called Jamaat-i-Islamis (ph). They have not done very well in elections, but they have been talked about in more recent months as among the more moderate of the elements of the Islamic right. And what was particularly interesting was that they've started talking more about clean government than about Islamic government.

But I think the reason people focus on the personality of the coup leaders, that coups tend to install single-person governments -- a dictatorship; I think he would aspire to a term more like enlightened despotism, but you still basically have the same punchline. I do know, from people I've spoken to, that they are approaching people I look on as serious players for some of the civilian leadership jobs. We'll see whom they are able to recruit.

We know at this point very little about who will be the personalities who run this government below the level of General Musharraf. He's only been in charge for eight days, so we know very little about how light or heavy-handed his rule is going to be. And I think most of those are still questions at this point.

REP. HASTINGS: I see. Let -- I'm sorry, Mr. Harrison.

MR. HARRISON: Not at all. I would just say that I think that what we should be focusing on is supporting a return to political processes that will throw (out?) leadership. I'm not going to nominate the next leaders of Pakistan. I think that has to happen internally through divisions that may occur within both the PPP and the Muslim League.

There are smaller parties on the moderate left that in the past the United States wouldn't think of touching which we should consider part of that political process. And I think that the regional political elements in Pakistan don't have a national platform but represent something at the local level, represent some of the democratic impulses in Pakistan that have to simply be given play.

There's no -- you know, it's a cliché to say that there are no shortcuts to democracy. But I think we certainly have to press for not just what the assistant secretary referred to as a decent and accountable government, but a government that really allows democratic processes to occur and involves a free press and involves a free judiciary, none of which is the case at this moment in Pakistan.

This talk about a true democracy makes me very nervous, because I've been talking to Pakistani leaders since the early 1950s, including all the military leaders who have been military leaders, and they've always wanted what is now being put in place, a government with a national security council that would be over and above the civilian ministers, who would not have a democratic base from which they emerged, but rather would be creatures of the military government. General Zia outlined his plan for a national security council to me in 1985 or '86. General Karamat (ph) was dismissed by Nawaz Sharif because he advocated that same thing.

This is an old struggle in Pakistan. It's a struggle between civilian and military authority.

We should just concentrate on being on the side of civilian authority. Nawaz Sharif's failure to give effective economic leadership is very tragic, because he was very brave in standing up to the military and in trying to pursue civilian authority. People have said that he wasn't a democrat. He did this, he did that, and so forth. The fact is he didn't allow the military to press its campaign for a national security council. He did stand for peace with India, and he took risks politically to do that.

So it's very tragic that he was a failure on other fronts and that he exposed himself to this action. And, of course, we don't yet know what happened with that airplane, which is a fascinating episode and also casts doubt on whether there's any way for him to return to power.

But, anyway, I think the answer to your question is we can't pick the democrats of Pakistan, but we can insist -- we can use whatever influence we have to work for the return of a democratic process in Pakistan.

REP. HASTINGS: Mr. Chairman, are we going to have a second round?

REP. BEREUTER: I have more questions. Why don't you proceed with another five minutes?

REP. HASTINGS: I'll try to do it in less. I'm interested -- thank you, Mr. Chairman -- that, Ambassador Schaffer, your statement reflects that there should be no high-level, high-profile embrace is the term that you used. And Mr. Harrison said that you hope that President Clinton goes to Bangladesh and India.

My question -- I have advocated -- I think there were missed opportunities in India and Pakistan by virtue of this administration early on not having visited there with high-profile summitry and everything else in the region. And I suggested that. I've documented it repeatedly. That is irrelevant at this point.

If the president were to go to only Pakistan and Bangladesh --

MS. SCHAFFER: You mean, India and Bangladesh?

MR. HARRISON: No, India and Bangladesh.

REP. HASTINGS: India and Bangladesh -- would that not exacerbate problems in the general area? And would it not lead some, no doubt, to advise him that you shouldn't go at all, for fear of exacerbating problems? The tradition has seemingly been that you go to India, you go to Pakistan, you go to Pakistan, you go to India; like you go to Israel, you go to Jordan. You understand what I'm saying? And so where are we on that? And I advocate, contrary to you, Ambassador, that he should still go; and doubtless, along the lines of what Mr. Harrison is saying, at least to Bangladesh and India.

MS. SCHAFFER: I would argue that a trip to Bangladesh and India is very much appropriate. Given the rarity of U.S. presidential visits in the region, I really can't recommend a visit to Pakistan under current circumstances. The last time a U.S. president visited South Asia, it was Jimmy Carter, and he only went to India. Certainly this idea that if you go to one, you have to go to the other, is of relatively recent vintage. And that's something I think we ought to be getting away from.

Now, there have been legions of high-level, mostly military visitors under the democratic governments of Pakistan who went to Pakistan and didn't necessarily go to India. And I think this is a good time to cultivate different strokes for different folks. But I think we have to be a little sophisticated about it. The Pakistanis will understand, particularly coming so soon after the military coup, that this is not the kind of thing they can expect from the United States. But they can expect a serious dialogue. They can expect us to listen seriously, and they can expect us to tell them what's on our mind.

MR. HARRISON: You've raised a very important point, and I want to make very clear what I think about this. It seems to me that the essence of our problem in South Asia has been that we've always felt that we had to treat India and Pakistan as if they were two equal countries. They're not. And I think that that's the root of the problem. Pakistan was given to believe that we wanted to balance things in the subcontinent by giving it a lot of military aid so that it could stand up to India and act as if it was an equal. That's been the root of the whole problem.

Right now they think that we're going to help them to get Kashmir, or at least to get India out of Kashmir. And we've got to bring all that to an end. If we had a constitutional government in Pakistan, of course, we should go there also. But under present circumstances, I think there's absolutely no reason why we should equate India and Pakistan. And India is what really counts for the United States in that part of the world.

Pakistan is important mainly to make sure that we don't have a lot of trouble that undermines the stability of the region as a whole, not because of its intrinsic importance, except that there are 130 million people there whose economic and social welfare is important. And that's why I favor economic aid being made available on economic criteria.

REP. HASTINGS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. BEREUTER: I'm happy to yield you the time. I have a few questions. If you can respond briefly, I'd appreciate it. But I know they're complicated.

Both of you have commented, I believe, about stopping military sales to Pakistan, and I have no argument with that concept. Would you, however, favor continued military-to-military contacts, including IMET? I'd ask both of you.

MS. SCHAFFER: I would.

REP. BEREUTER: Mr. Harrison?

MR. HARRISON: I don't have any problem with IMET, no.

REP. BEREUTER: All right.

MR. HARRISON: I would like to see that in lots of countries where we don't approve of the system.

REP. BEREUTER: Well, we've --

MR. HARRISON: So you could extend this, you know, in a rather broad --

REP. BEREUTER: We've run into situations, of course, where we've lost contact with a whole generation of military officers in a country, and I'm not sure it's been very positive in its impact. Mr. Harrison, you said one thing that's quite interesting and controversial, and that is that you would favor America declaring its support for the line of control in Kashmir as the permanent international boundary. And you say that eliminates the ambiguity which could embolden Pakistan to continue its present policy of seeking to affect that situation in Kashmir. Now, that would seem to be -- your position would seem to be supported by the Indians. But tell me a bit more about why that would be favorable on our part?

MR. HARRISON: Well, I think that it would have to be accompanied by India and Pakistan undertaking to give greater autonomy to the Kashmiris in their parts of Kashmir. The reason I favor this is that I think this is a cancer, and it's an opportunity; it's a place where Pakistan can keep bleeding India and making trouble indefinitely, as it has now for many, many years.

Inside Kashmir, my assessment of the forces inside Kashmir is that the forces are prepared to accommodate to an India that gives them autonomy as strong if not stronger than the forces favoring independence for Kashmir. Independence for Kashmir would be very disruptive of the stability of the subcontinent because of the fact that you have so many Muslims in India. And this would call into question the loyalty of those Muslims. You'd have Hindu-Muslim conflict in India. That would feed into a Pakistan conflict.

Our interest in that part of the world is stable development and economic progress. All this would be disrupted if the Kashmir issue is allowed to fester. Ambassador Schaffer wrote a very good op-ed piece with her husband in the Washington Post a while back that talked about why the line of control is probably the only realistic way to settle this issue.

So I think that so long as Pakistan -- the basic point is that Pakistan thinks that if they keep the fires burning, they can drag us into supporting their position, because we've supported it for so many years that they think they can get us back again to their side on Kashmir. And I think that's what we've got to disabuse them of. And the only way to disabuse them of that expectation, that hope, to get them to face the facts of life, to get them to agree to a settlement, is to make the line of control the basis of the settlement, the only realistic way to end this problem.

REP. BEREUTER: Thank you. I have --

MS. SCHAFFER: Could I make one comment on that?

REP. BEREUTER: Certainly.

MS. SCHAFFER: The only way in which I differ with my colleague is that I think that it would be useless and probably counterproductive for the U.S. government to publicly assert its support for the line of control as the basis for a settlement. The challenge of the Indians and the Pakistanis, if they're ever to deal seriously with Kashmir, is going to be building the political consensus behind the unpleasant things they have to do.

That means that I think the task for the U.S. government in the near-term is quietly, and behind the scenes, making it very clear to Pakistan that they will not support the efforts to get Kashmir away from India and that they don't see any possibility of a settlement that significantly changes the map. But you've got to allow them a little bit of private space to build a political consensus. And if you put all your positions in public, I think you destroy that chance.

REP. BEREUTER: Thank you. I have two more and final questions for both of you. One, do you have any sense that there is an Islamicization of the Pakistani military, a move towards fundamental Islamic orientation? Secondly, what does the coup (with this?) military government for Pakistan have in the way of an effect on Sino- Pakistani relations, if any?

MR. HARRISON: I have very definite views on this question. I think that there's been a struggle with the Pakistan military higher levels going back to the Afghan war between many officers who have an affinity, let us say, for Islamic fundamentalist thinking and connections, informal connections, with some of the Islamic fundamentalist groups, and others who are what you might call strictly professional soldiers with none of that in their minds.

Of course, we knew General Hamid Gul (ph) during the Afghan war -- (inaudible) -- the example of an ISI director who was very outspoken in his views on this subject. And I think what we've had -- so that goes back quite a way, and it's continued. And the Islamic fundamentalist forces have been growing in Pakistan. They have made us prime targets of trying to win friends in high places in the military and in middle-level places, and they have definitely gained ground.

General Musharraf is, of course, a soldier's soldier and a professional military man, and all of his colleagues are. But some of them are also people who have been a part of the ISI group and the groups friendly to it in the high levels who share a lot of the Islamic fundamentalist thinking. That doesn't mean they're not also professional military men. Of course, they are.

So I think what's new about this new situation is that you do have, at the high levels, a stronger influence, Islamic fundamentalist influence, in the Pakistan military than ever before. It's not as if they want to take Pakistan down the road of the agenda of some of these fundamentalist parties. Basically they have a hard-line approach toward India, a confrontational approach toward India, an agenda which is to bleed India, and an animus, get even for Bangladesh.

And they see these fundamentalist parties, which they have an affinity for, as allies, because these parties can provide the manpower to send people up to Kargil or wherever and to carry out operations without the need for people with Pakistani army uniforms. And so there's a natural partnership. And therefore, that's why I consider this a very dangerous period and why India is so suspicious of this new leadership and why General Musharraf and General Aziz happen to be the ones who cooked up this Kargil adventure.

So that your question, and -- (inaudible) -- is very well-taken. And I think that we should be very cautious in appraising the moderate professions of General Musharraf, and we should look to see what he does on the Kashmir cease-fire line, not moving back forces that had been moved forward anyway. He moved forward forces at the time of Kargil on the international border. They added to their deployment. All he's done now is pull them back. So we've gone back to the status quo ante. This is fine. This is a welcome gesture, and it's a cheap gesture.

So I think your question gets to the main point before us today and why we have to be very cautious. And I don't think it necessarily means they want to Talibanize Pakistan, but they do want to -- when they have a chance, they'll try to rekindle trouble with India.

REP. BEREUTER: Thank you.

MS. SCHAFFER: I would suggest that, besides watching what happens in Kashmir, you want to watch what happens in Afghanistan. The other interesting by-play, of course, is that the general whom Nawaz Sharif wanted to name to replace Musharraf when he fired Musharraf was the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence, which is, of course, the principal sponsor of the Taliban. He was also a personal friend, and he has also had a reputation for being very close to the Islamic right. So there may be some wheels within wheels at work.

You also asked about the impact on relations with China. The short answer is not much.

REP. BEREUTER: That's good news. Does the gentleman from Florida have any last thoughts or questions?

REP. HASTINGS: (Inaudible.)

REP. BEREUTER: Thank you. Thank you very much for sticking with us. Your testimony was very important to us. I've benefited from it. I know that all of our colleagues would have if they had been here. Thank you for spending the time. We appreciate it.

The subcommittee is adjourned.