Congressional Hearings/Resolutions

The Report of The National Commission on Terrorism

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Verbatim Excerpts from the Hearing

June 15, 2000

List of Speakers

• U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), Chairman
• U.S. Senator Paul s. Sarbanes (D-MD)
• U.S. Senator Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ)
• L. Paul Bremer, Chairman National Commission on Terrorism
• Maurice Sonnenberg, Vice Chairman, National Commission on Terrorism
• Michael Sheehan, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, State Department
• Dale Watson, Assistant Director for Counter-Terrorism, FBI
• James Reynolds, Chief of Terrorism and the Violent Crime Section, Criminal Division, Justice Department

HELMS: The meeting will come to order. And the chair, first of all, apologizes for the delay. It was not of the chair's making. We had to make a judgment in light of the fact that a vote was scheduled for 11:00 on the floor of the Senate. And I had to make a judgment as to whether to try to start and then stop. Now we will continue on through.

This morning, the Foreign Relations Committee will hear from the chairman and the vice chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism, which issued a bipartisan report last week that should serve as a wake-up call to the unrelenting threat of international terrorism.

Now whether intended or not, this bipartisan commission also paints a troubling picture of a Clinton administration that is pulling its punches in the fight against terrorism. The commission exposes a pattern in the administration of appeasing terrorist states and coddling governments that are AWOL in the fight against terrorism.

In the interest of time, I'll cite only one or two of the most egregious examples. For example, in March 2000 the Clinton administration set aside the evidence and its own preconditions to award or reward Iran with lucrative trade concessions. Now this appeasement sends a dangerous signal that when it is politically expedient, the United States of America will abandon its principles and let terrorist states off the hook.

So let me put it simply: If it's OK for Iran to murder American soldiers, what on Earth is not OK?

Now the case of Greece, an important NATO ally, is even more worrisome. The Greek government has done absolutely nothing to target terrorists who have murdered innocent Americans time and time again. Now we have some charts which show in graphic detail more than 100 terrorist attacks that have been carried out against United States citizens in Greece and only one -- only one -- has been solved.

Now we look forward to hearing your case, gentlemen, and we appreciate your coming. We appreciate your patience in waiting for the Senate to cooperate over in the Capitol.

The committee will then hear from a panel of administration witnesses regarding your recommendations.

Now the first witness we have is Mr. Maurice -- well, wait a minute, on this agenda I have -- OK, the honorable Paul Bremer III. You've got a father and a grandfather named the same thing. A long time.

BREMER: Yes, sir.

HELMS: This gentleman is chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism, and Mr. Maurice Sonnenberg, who's vice chairman.

And, gentlemen, we will begin with Mr. Bremer. And proceed at will.

BREMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you. I have a full statement which I'd like to enter in the record if I could?

HELMS: That's customary. That will be done.

BREMER: I will just briefly summarize it, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

HELMS: Thank you, sir.

BREMER: One of the main conclusions which you've already referred to is that the threat of international terrorism we think is on the rise and is changing in its character. The motives of terrorists seem to be changing, and we have to be concerned about the possibility that terrorist groups will resort to what we call catastrophic terrorism, acts which are designed to kill not hundreds but perhaps tens of thousands of Americans.

In other words, we're facing a serious question. And the commission took its role seriously, our job being basically to try to find ways to help save American lives. That's what is at the bottom of all of our recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, in the area of intelligence, we found that it is a -- it is a vital aspect of the fight against terrorism and some things need to be done. We feel that there are restrictions which are addressed more fully in the report against collection of terrorist information by the CIA abroad and by the FBI at home.

And we've recommended that some of those restrictions be eased. We think it's also important that that information be shared better. And we've made specific recommendations in particular for the collection of intelligence that the FBI comes across, getting that out to the intelligence community and decision-makers in a timely and useful fashion.

I should add, finally, in the area of intelligence we think that there -- the intelligence agencies, particularly CIA, FBI and most especially NSA, need more money. They need more resources to fight this fight. And we've made specific recommendations, which I draw your committee's attention to, which we have also talked to the Senate Intelligence Committee about.

Mr. Chairman, there are several aspects of our report which have been misrepresented in the last week or so. And I'd like to cover two of those just to be sure the record is clear. First of all, some people have reported that we have suggested a new program to monitor foreign students in the United States, with the implication that we're picking on a particular ethnic or religious group. Let me be clear about this. For more than 35 years, the United States has had a program in place whereby colleges and universities in the United States are required to keep the immigration service informed about all foreign students irrespective of their nationality that are studying at those institutions.

In other words, such a program has been in place for 35 years. In 1996, Congress, having found that a student who had overstayed his visa was involved in the World Trade Center attack which killed six Americans in 1993, Congress decided that the information was not flowing properly from the universities to the immigration service and instructed the attorney general to in effect computerize that program. INS has done that in the last couple of years. And all the commission has suggested is that that program, as is recommended by the immigration service, should be made nationwide now, collecting the same data that has been collected on foreign students for 35 years, without respect to what nationality they are.

Second area where there has been confusion is our recommendation about an appropriate role for the military in the event of a catastrophic attack. We think, Mr. Chairman, that it is important to think about the unthinkable, to think about the possibility that either a single catastrophic attack or several, or attacks taking place in the American soil while we are in hostilities abroad, that such an attack or series could go beyond the capability of local, state and federal officials to deal with -- and that the president should have available to him contingency plans to use the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense to respond to such an attack. That's what we've recommended, that contingency planning should be done.

Mr. Chairman, sometimes people have criticized this as a potential infringement on civil liberties. We take exactly the contrary view. Our view is that in the event of a catastrophic event, such as we're talking about, where you have tens of thousands of people dead, the pressures will be very great on the president and the leadership of this country to impinge on civil liberties unless they've done some contingency planning and thought it through ahead of time. And so we strongly recommend that such contingency planning be undertaken, be exercised, and that those plans be put on the shelf, hopefully to remain there forever. We think it is the height of irresponsibility not to at least think about the possibility of that happening.

Mr. Chairman, I know of interest to this committee in light of your comments, you are concerned about states which support terrorism.

We addressed this in the report. It is true that two of the countries that support terrorism are right now, Iran and Syria, undergoing some kind of change domestically. We don't know exactly what.

In the case of Iran, it's true that Americans may hope that President Khatemi will institute sensible, political and economic reforms that can bring Iran back into the world of nations. But the regrettable fact is that Iran continues to be the world's leading supporter of terrorism.

In fact, in the period since President Khatemi's death, Iranians support for terrorism, particularly for terrorist groups opposed to peace in the Middle East, has actually increased. As you note, there is also evidence that Iran may have been behind the attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 American soldiers.

Our committee felt that there was a danger that the administration might be giving signals to Iran, and perhaps to our allies, that our concern about Iranian terrorism is weakening, and so we recommended no further concessions to the government of Iran until it stops support for terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, it's too early to know if President Assad's death will bring any change in that country's support for terrorism. In American conversations with the new leaders of Syria, it is certainly our hope that we will make clear that Syria cannot expect normal relations with the outside world until it takes concrete, measurable steps to stop the support for terrorism. Hopefully, the new leader of that country will come to understand that such a step is a prerequisite to obtaining Western trade and investment essential to modernizing Syrian economy. As with Iran, we believe American policy should take its cue from Missouri: Show me.

Mr. Chairman, in the case of other countries which support terrorism, there are also potential changes. North Korea comes to mind; we've all seen the events that took place in Pyongyang yesterday. But here, again, I think our view should be we want to see concrete measures taken, not words, not promises, not agreements to do these things, concrete steps.

Mr. Chairman, I think that in the interest of time, I will skip over the rest of my report, and simply say that I'm pleased with some of my fellow commissioners have been able to join us today in addition to my colleague, the vice chairman, Mr. Sonnenberg. We have with us here, also, Ms. Juliette Kayyem, Dr. Richard Betis...

HELMS: If you will stand.

BREMER: Sure, please. Juliette Kayyem, Dr. Richard Betis.

HELMS: Thank you, sir.

BREMER: Former Congresswoman Jane Harman.

HELMS: Thank you.

BREMER: And Gardner Pekam.

HELMS: Thank you. We appreciate your coming, all of you.

BREMER: That concludes my statement.

HELMS: Very well. Mr. Sonnenberg.

SONNENBERG: Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing us to present our statements here today. I have a very brief statement, because some of what I would have said has been already stated by the chairman. And basically, it's the following: This has been a genuinely bipartisan effort. The membership of this commission covers the full political spectrum from political to conservative and represents a wide range of ethnic, religious and professional backgrounds.

The press has referred to our commission as being made of six Republicans and four Democrats, but I can tell you on a nonclassified basis there's one Republican appointee here who's probably a Democrat. That makes it 50-50.

(LAUGHTER)

HELMS: Good.

SONNENBERG: During six months, we've spent hours debating, and in some cases agonizing, the issues addressed in this report. At no point was there any acrimony. As you can see, there's probably one lone footnote, one footnote in a lone dissent on the question of the FISA request.

Even in this case, however, while the majority of us disagreed with the dissenting commissioner, we respected her position as one of sincere belief.

It should be understood that the 10 highly qualified individuals -- well, at least nine, I'll let someone else judge me -- but, in any case, 10 individuals on this committee writing on their own would no doubt have put forward 10 somewhat different perspectives on many of these issues. Through diligence and a sense of mutual respect, we have been able to put together a coherent, formidable report.

A few final remarks: Terrorism must not become a pretext for discrimination against one segment of society. Terrorists often claim responsibility for violent actions on behalf of ethnic groups, religions and entire nations, but these claims are false and must be understood to be such. Those willing to carry out terrorist acts make up only a minuscule part of any group.

Furthermore, this commission has taken great pains to keep in mind the rights of individuals under the Constitution and to balance those rights with the need to protect the citizenry as a whole from the scourge of terrorism.

One final point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to my chairman, Ambassador Bremer, and point out he's done a yeoman's job in both moderating the different viewpoints of the commission and crafting the report you see before you. He somehow managed at the same time to leave everyone's ego intact and good spirits there too.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

HELMS: Well, thank you, both of you gentlemen.

We have other senators on the way, I am told, but several have commitments that they can't leave because they are presiding in other committees. This is a busy time of the year, and I like it that way because then I can ask all the questions I want to.

Seriously, let me ask about North Korea. Are you encouraged by the developments there with respect to terrorism?

BREMER: Well, I think it's a bit early to make a judgment as to what happened yesterday, Mr. Chairman. Certainly the communiqué has the right tone. It's a little weak on substance, but at least there seems to be a process that has begun between North and South, which after all in the end lies at the heart of the reconciliation on the peninsula.

The concerns with North Korea on terrorism involve the fact that North Korea continues to provide safe haven, in effect, for a number of Japanese terrorists and that there are credible reports that at least as late as last year North Korea was selling weapons to terrorist groups. So I think as the process of resumed reconciliation goes on between the North and the South, and as this has an impact on our relations with North Korea, we need to continue to have terrorism at least in the dialogue that we have with the North Koreans.

HELMS: You never know what tips the scales in a development like this North Korea deal with the South. I have a friend, probably well- known to you as well, Franklin Graham, who is Billy Graham's son. Now Billy Graham has been concentrating, himself, on North Korea.

HELMS: And Franklin, over the last several months, has been doing that. And he's had surprising entry into discussions on a personal basis with the leaders there. So you never know what causes big events to happen. But those two men, from my state, both of them long time friends.

But let me go back to Iran. The administration has been, I think, sort of stonewalling us on Khobar Towers and has increased its support for terrorists. All that is to say, don't these unilateral concessions undermine the credibility of our overall anti-terrorism policy?

BREMER: Mr. Chairman, I think we looked at this very closely on the commission. And I think we're understanding of the point that counterterrorism cannot be the only objective in American foreign policy. The second point, that there are developments in Iran which are potentially encouraging. It is potentially encouraging that we may have a more reform-minded, perhaps more open to the West, government coming to power in Iran.

And so we understand that this is not a black or white question. But what is black or white is that the Iranian government, elements of the Iranian government, continue to support terrorism and continue to be major supporters of groups which are violently opposed to peace in the Middle East. Those are the facts.

And our recommendation really grew out of, basically, a concern similar to yours that our gestures toward the new Iranian government might be misinterpreted both in Iran and elsewhere as a weakening of our resolve on counterterrorism. And that's why we don't think any more should be done.

SONNENBERG: I would add to that that there is a problem in terms of a duality within Iran. The duality is, you've got the ministry of information, the Republican Guard, who in my opinion are actively engaged in supporting terrorism. There are those elements which happen to be "more moderate." It's very difficult sometimes to conduct the foreign policy in a black and white situation, as the chairman points out. And, therefore, we felt that the concessions that had been made, that's sufficient. I mean, when they're done, they're done.

But at this point, unless there is early evidence of them ceasing, meaning those two particular agencies of the Iranian government and the military guard, it becomes important to not make any more concessions at this point. Now, that doesn't mean discussion and negotiation -- negotiation perhaps is too early a word, but at least, discussions.

HELMS: Fine.

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HELMS: Senator Sarbanes.

SARBANES: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know the chairman is anxious to move on to the next panel, and I just have two or three questions I want to put to this panel.

First of all, I note that in the appendix, where you indicated those that the commission consulted or interviewed or had discussions, that you indicated you had met with officials of a number of governments.

BREMER: Yes.

SARBANES: And in that regard, I was interested, since you pinpointed Greece and Pakistan in your report in a very pointed way, whether you met with or had discussions with any officials of those countries.

BREMER: Not with Pakistan and I don't think with Greece. The commission itself, as a commission, did not meet with officials of those governments.

SARBANES: But you did meet with officials of a number of governments.

BREMER: Yes, we did. We met with governments which are cooperating with us in the fight against terrorism.

SARBANES: Well, now I talked to Ambassador Burns who feels that he's getting good cooperation, that this is a serious problem and it's one that we've been focused on for quite some time. And I'm concerned by the suggestion here that either the prime minister or the foreign minister, both of whom seems to me very strongly committed to trying to do something about the terrorism problem, are you questioning their commitment to this, Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Papandreou?

BREMER: We took no position on the role of any particular individual in the Greek government. All we said was we thought that the record justified our recommendation that the president should consider making Greece or Pakistan a country that is not fully cooperating.

SONNENBERG: And the statements recently by the government have been rather strong, and we feel helpful in this situation.

SARBANES: Well, of course, they made an initiative now to the Europe Union along with the British for a joint anti-terrorism effort. The government has offered a $2.8 million reward.

What did you make of the arrest of Abram Lesbarolgo (ph) last December, in terms of the fight against terrorism in Greece?

BREMER: I'm sorry, I don't know what you are referring to, Senator.

SARBANES: Well, Lesbarolgo (pH) was picked up at the border trying to come back into Greece. He's now in jail because he tried to come in on forged documents. They regard it as a major success in trying to get at an anti-terrorism group. He was part of the group, anti-state struggle, and they're now scheduling a trial for him in October of this year on murder and attempted murder based on his terrorist activities. But that arrest and that movement against that individual has not come to your attention?

BREMER: No, we -- what we looked at in the case of Greece was a rather poor record over the last 25 years, Senator. There have been almost a hundred and a half attacks on American targets in Greece in the last 25 years and basically only in one case has even an arrest been made and the person who was arrested was then freed after two days. Four Americans have been killed in Greece by terrorism.

And the thing that we focused on most in terms of Greece in the last year, not the case you mentioned, but was the fact that senior Greek government officials assisted in the escape of a Kurdish terrorist, Ocalan, through Greece, and that the Greek ambassador gave him refuge in his embassy in Nairobi, until he was finally turned over to authorities.

It is, as the State Department said, the weakest link in the fight against terrorism in Europe. And if the events of the last week, which have lead, as my vice chairman points out, to some statements, if these events lead to the Greek government now finally actually making some arrests against November 17, I think we would all welcome that.

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HELMS: Panel two, the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, coordinator for counterterrorism, Department of State; Mr. Dale L. Watson, assistant director of counterterrorism, FBI; and James S. Reynolds, chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section, Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. In that order, left to right, please.

HELMS: Mr. Watson, I understand I made an error. I used an acting in your title. You are director; you're not acting director.

WATSON: I'm the assistant director in charge of counterterrorism, yes, sir.

HELMS: Mr. Sheehan, we'll go, from my view, left to right, and we'll hear from you gentlemen. And then we've got three guys here who are going to ask you some questions.

You may proceed.

SHEEHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HELMS: Did you have prepared statements? They will all be printed in the record, et cetera, et cetera.

SHEEHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, senators and distinguished members of the commission and the staff. Thank you for the opportunity to present the Department of State's response to the commission's report on terrorism.

I have a long set of remarks, Mr. Chairman, as you said, I'll provide those for the record. I'd just like to make a few brief introductory remarks this afternoon.

The commission's review of our counterterrorism situation at this time was a very serious report about a serious issue, and done by an outstanding and diverse group of professionals. I'd like to especially to commend Ambassador Jerry Bremer, my of my predecessors in this job, for a very outstanding job. He's one of the predecessors I stay in touch with, of many of the ones who worked in this job before me.

Our counterterrorism policy has been one of continuity over the last 20 or 30 years. Although we are constantly changing and adopting to the new threats, this policy has, in my view, worked fairly well over that time period. I think it's worth noting the success of our policy. I'm proud of the work of this administration, and particularly my boss, Secretary Albright, and her commitment on counterterrorism. And she has built upon the policies that have been designed and put into place over the last 20 years from both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue and from a strong bipartisan approach over the last several administrations.

Mr. Chairman, I think it's worth noting that last year in counterterrorism we had a fairly good year from the United States' perspective. We lost five people from acts of international terrorism last year; three in Colombia and two in Rwanda.

We were fortunate, though. We could have had more had the plot in Jordan been successful or if the Algerian suspect, Ressam, was successful in bringing explosives in the United States. So thank God and through some luck and a lot of hard work, we had one of the better years in about seven or eight years in the United States.

Also, this year, I'd like to note -- and, again, every night I go to bed worrying about a phone call about American bodies being brought back to Andrews Air Force Base -- but as of yet, this year, we have zero casualties from international terrorism. Although I feel personally about the British general who died in Greece last week, as they were one of our closet partners in counterterrorism, the British.

We've had a pretty good year, we've had some success. We've had some success in the Middle East, Mr. Chairman. And I'd also like to note that last year for the first time in many, many years, Egypt had zero deaths from international terrorism. Jordan also had a very good year; King Abdullah stood up to the plate and delivered on some serious counterterrorism issues. The Palestinian Authority working cooperatively.

We've made great progress in the Middle East, which used to be the main swamp of terrorists for Americans. Last year, the Middle East was the only region in the world that had a decline in the number of international terrorist incidences.

The reason we've had success has not been an accident, Mr. Chairman. It's been through the policies that were put in place over the last 20 years, and I think we need to continue those, and we need to adapt to the new threats. I applaud the work of the commission in identifying some of those new threats, the new types of non-state-sponsored threats that are emerging, also the threat of weapons of mass destruction that could greatly skewer the good statistics we've had over the last year in one catastrophic event.

So I'm not suggesting that we lower our guard at all. We have to redouble our efforts, continue what has worked in the past to deny sanctuary to terrorists, to deny the amount of state sponsorship of terrorists, and adapt to the new non-state-sponsored terrorists that are increasingly a threat that we see.

The Congress, I'd like to say, Mr. Chairman, has provided me, as the coordinator for counterterrorism in the State Department, the key instruments I use to fight terrorism. And they include the designation of foreign terrorists organizations, the designation of state sponsorship of terrorism, sanctions legislation, and our annual report. All these instruments that have been agreed on by the Congress and the administration, in my view, are extremely important.

The commission made several recommendations regarding state sponsorship, flexibility in that. Actually many of those came through some discussion I had with Ambassador Bremer over the designation of foreign terrorists organizations and other means that we can fine-tune those instruments to better strengthen our response to international terrorism.

I think the commission has some good ideas. I've talked to many of the members of your staff who have great expertise in this area about these issues, and I think over the next months within the government we're going to study these proposals, talk to members of the committee and the staff, and think about ways that we can fine tune some of these instruments that were designed over the last 20 years and adapt them to the new threats.

But I must say we must continue to stay the course on the political and diplomatic fronts. The report makes a lot of good recommendations on the intelligence and law enforcement fronts, which as are also -- which are very important.

But in my view, the key to success in counterterrorism over the longer view is political will.

In fact, we know where most terrorists are. We know where they are. They're in Afghanistan, they're in Iran, they're in other pockets around the world. Political will to drying the swamp, to deny sanctuary to the leadership of terrorists organization is the key to the success of our policy in the long term.

And that's why I look forward to working with your committees in the future to fine-tune our policies, to adjust ourselves to the emerging threats and continue on the rather positive course that we've had over the last years in defeating the scourge the terrorism that threatens our country.

Mr. Chairman, I'd also can't miss the opportunity to mention resources, that I'm glad Senator Biden mentioned. We in fact have had cut from the administration's request in some of the appropriations committees.

Again, thank you and Senator Biden for the support you've given our efforts. I look forward to working with you and members of your staff as we wind through the appropriations process. This year we have some very important initiatives in counterterrorism that are on the table right now. Some seem to be not going too well in the appropriations process. We'll need your help in those and other areas.

And thank you for your time this afternoon, Senator and Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering your questions.

HELMS: Thank you, sir.

We will go on five minutes, because these gentlemen have got to go, and I apologize for having kept you here all morning.

But, look, I want to ask all three of you, I agree with the commission's recommendation that the president should make clear to Syria that it will remain on the list of terrorist states until it shuts down its terrorist training camps and chokes off supplies to terrorist groups. Now, do you think the death of Assad is going to make any difference? Is his boy going to be any better than he was? That ball's in the air, anybody...

(CROSSTALK)

SHEEHAN: I'll take a crack at that, Mr. Chairman. I think it remains to be seen whether that will change. We're hopeful, obviously, but only thing that matters to us how -- what he does, and we'll have to see. But Syria remains on the list of state sponsorship; there's no movement at this time to take them off.

In my annual report I mention one of the largest threats to the United States is the arc of terrorism from Teheran through Damascus into Lebanon, where those terrorist groups through that arc threaten the Middle East peace process.

Syria's an important part of that arc of terrorism. They need to shut down the terrorist groups that are operating within their borders, and that's what they'll be required to do in the years ahead.

SHEEHAN: And I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, that Secretary Albright always keeps this on the top of her list in discussions with the Syrians as part of the peace process or any other discussions she has with them.

HELMS: Do you have any comment?

WATSON: No, I agree with Ambassador Sheehan, Mr. Chairman.

HELMS: Is it too early to make contact with him about this, either by you or somebody else in the administration?

SHEEHAN: I think in the first meeting -- I haven't talked to Secretary Albright about it, specifically, yet. I think in her initial meeting, it was just expressing condolences, but I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that on the top of the list of any contacts with the Syrian government will be their support for terrorism.

HELMS: Very well.

Let me ask you, Mr. Watson, has the FBI drawn any preliminary conclusions about who may have been responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing? If you don't want to answer...

WATSON: Mr. Chairman, that's a very ongoing, sensitive matter that the director and I are deeply involved with. I would be more than happy to try to -- not in a open forum, but to give you some of that...

HELMS: I certainly understand that. Now let me ask you this...

WATSON: Yes, sir?

HELMS: I understand that the FBI has summarized its conclusions and has detailed in a cable designated, FBI 21204. Are you aware of this cable?

WATSON: Was that the cable that went out last spring, in '99. Is that what you're talking about? It's unfortunate that that got out, and I would -- I'm really uncomfortable talking about the case in open session. I've already...

HELMS: OK. Just one question.

WATSON: Yes, sir?

HELMS: Can I get a copy of it.

WATSON: Let me get back with you on that.

HELMS: OK. That's OK. Paul.

SARBANES: Mr. Watson.

WATSON: Yes, sir?

SARBANES: Is the FBI yet in a position to comment on the commission's proposal that the Department of Defense take over, in effect, command and control if we have a significant terrorist attack in the country?

WATSON: Yes, sir. My comments on that personally, and I think it reflects the views of the director, is that on the consequent side, as you well know that FEMA's in charge, on the crisis side, the FBI is in charge. What the commission is talking about -- I think Ambassador Bremer said that this morning -- is if something happens on a large- scale, if half of Dallas, Texas is blown up for whatever reason, in a chemical, biological, mainly a nuclear-type deal, the local authorities will be, in fact, stretched so far that if you're talking about mobile hospitals, if you're talking about isolating people, if you're talking about enforcing a certain quarantine area, there is -- I think at that point the military would have to be involved.

There are procedures -- as we went through with the Top-Off exercise a couple of weekends ago -- there are procedures -- and maybe Mr. Reynolds would want to comment on that -- that are established, where you ask the military to come in and have the president waive posse comitatus.

Should the military do that? If you talk to the military folks, and I encourage you to do that, I think, in reality, I think they realize they will have to do it because they're the only ones capable, but at the same time, they understand the mission creep role of the military. And unless Mr. Reynolds wants to add anything, that's where we're at.

But on regular crisis type situations, with us and FEMA lashed up on the crisis-consequence side, we work very closely with the military, and there's no need for the military to, quite honestly, take that responsibility over.

SARBANES: Mr. Reynolds?

REYNOLDS: Well, I would simply say that there are -- there is legislation in place as part of Nunn-Lugar and as part of the nuclear terrorism statute, which would allow under extreme situations the use of the military. The military is not in charge of the law enforcement situation; they function under the leadership of the FBI. But those statutes do exist for use of the military. They're separate statutes that allow use of the military for technical assistance and then there are the separate statutes that allow use of the military for consequence management.

REYNOLDS: So there is already in place a statutory regime for a use for the military in an orderly pattern. And I'm not aware, like Mr. Watson, at this point of a basis to change the formula that exists.

SARBANES: Now, I wasn't all together clear whether the commission was fully cognizant of those statutes, and the role that's already been developed or programmed for the military under circumstances that would seem to warrant them playing a role, and whether this is then going beyond that or whether they, in effect, are duplicating that. I know you can't answer that; we obviously should have put that to the commission when they were here.

Mr. Reynolds, I had another question to put to you.

There's a section in the report where the commission seems to contradict itself. They say the Department of Justice applies the statute governing electronic surveillance and physical searches of international terrorists in a cumbersome and overly cautious manner. I'm sure you're familiar with that section of the report. And then they sketch out what they think some of the problems are in terms of going to the FISA for an order, and how you work it up.

But then they conclude this section by saying: " During the period leading up to the millennium, the FISA application process was streamlined without lowering the FISA standards. Applications were submitted to the FISA court by DOJ promptly and with information to establish probable cause," which in effect seems to say, at least through that period of time, it was -- this process was being done the way the commission was seeking to have it done.

Has there been a basic change in the process or is that something extraordinary?

REYNOLDS: Senator, let me explain the way in which the intelligence electronic surveillance works in the department, which will be by way of saying that I think Dale Watson, or perhaps someone else is the better to answer the question.

The work that I do involves the case development of criminal cases and the prosecution of criminal cases against terrorists. In turn, the use of electronic surveillance in the intelligence are is based on a representation to the FISA court that that electronic surveillance is undertaken for national security purposes, as opposed, per se, to criminal prosecution purposes.

And as a prudential step within the department, criminal prosecutors, the function that I have is one that is separated from the decision as to whether or not to seek FISA electronic surveillance. The objective there is to make sure that FISA surveillance is not perceived to have been misused for the purpose of criminal prosecution.

Dale Watson, in his role as assistant director, is involved with the submission to our Office of Intelligence Policy and Review of FISA applications. And, additionally, anticipating the possibility that this kind of question might arise, I bought with me somebody from our Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, who could respond if you wished.

WATSON: Senator, to answer your question, the intelligence act of the FISA, which you referred to, was actively involved in on the intelligence case paralleling the criminal case during the millennium threat of the Seattle incident.

There the focus was so extreme, moving toward the rollover of January 1, that there were matters that were taken within hours and able to obtain the proper court authorized electronic surveillance. Is that a sea change from what we normally do on a daily basis? We deal with them on a daily basis, that was in the matter of a crisis type, the process seemed to worked faster, because the director of the FBI was present along with the attorney general.

I think there has been progress made in that arena. I think they need some more help. It involves staff work. I think we don't always agree about probable cause, but that's a normal process. I think the head of OICR, Fran Fragos Townsend's (pH) done a good job, as we move that forward and the dialogue that we have.

So I hope that answers your question.

SARBANES: Well, I mean what it suggests, by the commission's own statement, that there was a period of time there when the system seemed to working sort of the way they thought it was desirable for it to work. You're telling me that that was in part because it was being handled on a crisis basis, but conceivably a lot of that stuff up in processing could continue on a regular basis, if you're provided the resources with which to do it. Is that what you're saying?

WATSON: Yes. And it's mainly a resource issue with them. And we don't -- I mean, we engage in a dialogue. If it's a routine matter, that probably takes a little longer. You know, I mean, there's information they need from us and back and forth. It's a give and take. But if something happens, it's rushed through.

SARBANES: Thank you.

HELMS: I ask your attention to these charts. And I was asking staff, they've refurnished this hearing room so that we have cameras that I can't see, and I hope they are focused on the two charts.

Now these charts show case after case of unsolved terrorists attacks involving the Greek government, suggesting that there's a toleration of terrorism. Now in your opinion, aside from those countries which are state sponsors of terrorism, is there any government having a worse track record than Greece in fighting terrorism?

Now let me add that the State Department has proposed Greece for the pilot visa waiver program. A visa waiver program would give intelligence and law enforcement officers a chance to check the identity of people who want to enter the United States. In light of what's on these charts here, and given how easy it is apparently for terrorists and criminals to obtain phony passports, is it prudent to eliminate the visa requirement.

So I want you to look at the charts and then respond to that question.

Mr. Sheehan.

SHEEHAN: Mr. Chairman, first of all, in terms of -- in our annual report, we stated that Greece was the weakest link in Europe in our counterterrorism efforts, and I stand by that statement.

I've been to talk to officials in Greece with our ambassador there. Undersecretary Pickering has been there. We've had some very blunt conversations with members of that government and what we expect them to do. The bottom line is that the need to -- they need to arrest, try and jail terrorists.

We've also given them a list of specific steps that we think they could take that would help move that process forward.

They've begun to take some steps in that direction. I think it's extraordinarily important, in the light of the recent killing of the British general in Athens, that they redouble their efforts and make progress on that case, as well as many of the other outstanding cases that are pending.

In terms of the visa waiver program, Mr. Chairman, prior to me coming on to this assignment, from what I understand was -- there's a strict criteria of determining whether countries are eligible for the visa waiver program. In the case of Greece, they don't meet that criteria yet.

The last time I talked to Ambassador Burns, he didn't expect that they would meet that in the near term, in the next months. It remains to be seen when and if they'll meet that criteria. I think we'll be very vigilant to ensure that they meet the strict criteria required before they are accepted into any visa waiver program.

HELMS: Mr. Watson.

WATSON: Yes, sir. We've been working with the Greeks on 17-N, with part of a task force since 1997. We have made some progress in that investigation, but it has been a slow process.

Are the Greeks doing all they can in the view of the FBI to solve the 17-N problem? We feel like we've made some progress there. They don't do things as fast as we would normally want things to happen. The arrest of the individual that Senator Sarbanes talked about in December, we would have immediately followed up on some searches outside the country. It took them a while to get there. They eventually got there, requesting DNA and blood samples from the German -- I mean, those types of things.

We have offered training. We have given them some training, an aspect of that. But our task force continues, and we're going to continue to work on that, on the 17-N problem, until we make some headway.

We have been frustrated -- by the government's changed. I've been over there. I've talked to Ambassador Burns and representatives of the government, as well as the director of the FBI. So it's a fine balance here.

Should they get the visa waiver program? I think there are restrictions there that need to be corrected. I'm not really, you know, into that arena where I make a recommendation or not. But to say that we haven't made any progress would not be accurate. We haven't made the kind of progress that probably you and Senator Sarbanes would like to see, but we are moving forward in that case.

HELMS: Mr. Bremer.

BREMER: As you know, the Department of Justice and the FBI attempt to aggressively apply the extraterritorial jurisdiction which Congress has given us. There have been a number of crimes in Greece that would be subject to prosecution in the United States. To date, efforts with Greek authorities have not been sufficient to put us in a position to prosecute those cases.

BREMER: We are endeavoring to do everything possible to improve our efforts with Greece. There is, as I'm sure this committee knows, an MLAT that was signed recently with Greece, which is pending ratification. There is a draft police cooperation agreement with Greece that is in the hopper and that I would anticipate will be executed.

The visa waiver program, there was a nomination originally by the State Department of Greece. From the law enforcement aspect of the Department of Justice, there has been some concern. There was a visit led by INS to Greece to evaluate the situation. And at this point there has not been an agreement to include Greece into the visa waiver program, but it is at this point an open matter that continues to be studied and awaits further input.

SARBANES: In fact, bringing Greece along to meet the criteria necessary for the visa waiver program would accomplish some important steps in terms of security, would it not? I understand one criteria was becoming a full member of the Shengen (pH) agreement, full integration into the European Union's border security system. I think that's been done, as I understand it. The other was a better control over the issuance of passports, which was an important question. Now it's done on a decentralized basis with very little control and certainly no centralized control. And I gather a serious consideration is being given to centralizing that process, which would heighten significantly security with respect to passport issuances. Is that correct?

SHEEHAN: Yes. Jim, do you want to comment on that...

(CROSSTALK)

REYNOLDS: Yes. I believe you're correct on the first point, that the first of the two problems that was raised has now been resolved and the issue that, Senator, that you have articulated is an issue of continuing concern, and there will be an examination of the efforts by Greek authorities to correct that.

I don't mean to suggest to you that if that's corrected that it's a foregone conclusion. There is a decision-making process. But this is a matter that is an open matter is under consideration and review.

HELMS: Mr. Reynolds, weeks ago I wrote to the State Department requesting information, documents, relating to Greece's meeting the criteria on the visa waiver program. A lot of the mail that comes to the State Department, directed to the State Department by both the House and the Senate, apparently falls into a black hole down there in Foggy Bottom. I want somebody to answer that request of mine.

And I saw Madeleine last night at a function and I started to ask her then, but I thought that was not quite appropriate. But would you folks make sure that I get that document?

SHEEHAN: I will, Mr. Chairman.

HELMS: OK.

TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman, could I ask about -- inquiry about a different matter that you were -- you or Senator Sarbanes were...

(CROSSTALK)

HELMS: Certainly. Certainly. And I'm through, and I don't know whether Paul is now...

TORRICELLI: ... about Greece?

I just needed a moment, if I could, on two other countries...

HELMS: You go right ahead.

TORRICELLI: ... that are not involved...

(CROSSTALK)

HELMS: I'm here for you.

TORRICELLI: Mr. Secretary, in 1995 Pakistan handed over to American authority something that is very important in my state of New Jersey and to our neighbors in New York, and that was Mr. Yousef, who had been involved in the World Trade Center bombing. In 1997 they turned over Mr. Kasi, who was responsible for shooting a CIA officer at the headquarters in Langley. Pakistan in 1998 was cooperative; indeed, they apprehended Mr. Odeh, who had been involved in the U.S. bombings in East Africa. And last year Mr. al-Deek (pH), who was implicated in the East Africa bombings, was arrested and turned over to Jordan, with the expectation he'd come to the United States.

Those are several of the largest terrorist incidents committed against the United Stats in the last decade, and Pakistan was cooperative and instrumental in apprehending or extraditing people involved in each incident. You can imagine the surprise, therefore, to find comments in the terrorism report, if I could quote it directly, that Pakistan was not fully cooperative, might have been the operational words, in the fighting of terrorism. It would not surprise me that a few nations probably meet fully the standards that we would like and may not be cooperative in each instance as we would define them, but this does not appear to be a good example of providing incentive and giving thanks the people that's helped us what are several major incidents involving terrorism against the United States.

Would you respond --- why this, your own views, in this apparent contradiction of the record with the conclusions in the report?

SHEEHAN: I'll answer that, Senator.

First of all, those that you mentioned are correct, and there are actually more that they have sent back to the United States. I would make a few comments in that regard.

First, I think it's actually indicative of the shift of the center of gravity of terrorism from the Middle East to South Asia, that this is also indicative of. Most of the problems that I face right now, as the coordinator for counterterrorism, are increasingly coming out of South and Central Asia.

And Pakistan is, in fact, a victim of terrorism as well. They have cooperated on specific cases of helping to provide extradition of people.

SHEEHAN: But let me say this also, Senator, that we have serious concerns with policies of the government of Pakistan, regarding their support for organizations involved in terrorism. I have clearly outlined that in my annual report. We also have problems with their very close relation with the Taliban.

I must say that although Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism, which we said in our annual report, the area of concern I'm most worried about, in terms of the projection of terrorist threats to American shores and to American interests around the world, comes from Afghanistan.

And Afghanistan is the key; we must drain that swamp of terrorists. And our cooperation with Pakistan is important in that regards. Pakistan is a long-standing friend of the United States. I served in the United States military on two occasions with the Pakistani army, an army I know well.

On the other hand, at the same time, some of the policies that Pakistan is pursuing, especially regarding Afghanistan, are of concern. The United States government would have very frank conversations with them.

I think that the chief executive Musharraf increasingly understands the problem of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. He hears it not only from the United States, but from many of his neighbors. He also understands that it threatens his own stability of Pakistan itself.

I think our policy in Pakistan needs to be very carefully nuanced. They do cooperate with us, on time. They are threatened by it. We want to help them address this threat that threatens them and us. And we are pushing them in several areas where we think they need to improve their policy...

TORRICELLI: This goes to the heart of the fact that there is a contemporary problem with the use of the term terrorism and how it applies to policy. The United States legitimately can have concern with another government having relationships with nations that do not meet accepted levels of behavior and being involved in activities against other states. Those are all legitimate concerns of the United States government. But the primary level of concern should be actions taken against the United States or our people or our direct interests. That is the first level of concern. And I'm trying to differentiate them.

On that level of concern, in the World Trade Center bombing, the bombings of our embassies, the assassination of the CIA official, Pakistan has been cooperative. I understand we disagree with their policies with Afghanistan, actions they've taken against India, groups that may be operating from their soils. And I understand you only have one report to issue. But my central point here is, if we were issuing reports on whether they are cooperative in law enforcement on major cases involving the United States, I would express great gratitude for the cooperation. Indeed, I have noted, you have said, and I will quote you, "Pakistan is a friendly country. They cooperate with us on terrorist issues."

On a different level of relations with foreign governments, and what the implications be, we may not necessarily give them the same grade. But it is that differentiation that I wanted to make.

The second issue, an issue that I know the chairman has addressed before, you have by your own testimony here today cited that Iran is in a unique situation, that it could harbor and be responsible for more terrorists acts than any other state.

SHEEHAN: I stated that they are the most active state sponsor. That it is the testimony of the director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Tenet, and one that I agree with.

TORRICELLI: It is, in my mind, a contradiction, that is it possible to commit illegitimate terrorists acts against a terrorist entity itself? I'm actually not stating a conclusion, I'm posing a question.

The department has listed the People's Mujahedeen, as a terrorist group. More than 100 members of the House of Representatives, the majority of the United States Senate in previous years, have actually asked the State Department to engage in dialogue with the People's Mujahedeen, that it was better to communicate with them. They have the objective of overthrowing the Iranian government. They engage in military operations against the Iranian government.

And again, I'm not seeking a conclusion, but I am posing a question. Can it be illegitimate, by definition, to engage in military acts against an illegitimate government that is the principal international sponsor of terrorism? Or indeed, do a people not have a right to engage in military actions, citing the preamble of our Constitution and our own Declaration of Independence, do people not have a right and a responsibility to overthrow what is a terrorist government that is illegitimately founded?

And how, in citing these organizations, do you deal with this contradiction?

SHEEHAN: Senator, you ask a good question. It gets to the heart of an issue that's a very sensitive one for counterterrorism policy, and that's drawing a very fine line but a clear line between acts of war or insurgency, which are covered under the Geneva Convention, and acts of terrorism, which we consider criminal.

SHEEHAN: One of the central tenets of our counterterrorism policy, which I alluded to earlier in my remarks, the success that we have enjoyed over the last 20 years and the last several administrations, is the depoliticizing acts of terrorism, criminalizing the act and focusing on that act, that assassination, that bombing, that killing of citizens, and stripping away the political agenda of any group, because all terrorist groups wrap themselves in legitimate and sometimes not so legitimate causes.

In the case of the MEK, we have a very meticulous process, that we review with all the agencies in the counterterrorism community, to review the acts of terrorism that they have been involved with. And because of those acts, not because of their policies regarding -- against the Iranian government or any other type of -- even armed acts that they might take against them, but because they have been involved in terrorism, they've been put on the list of foreign terrorist organizations.

And if they were to not do terrorism, not be involved in terrorism for a period of the last two years, they would be dropped from that list. It's a very careful criteria that we review and -- but I would say, Senator, that it's very important that all organizations, whatever their cause, not use a terrorism instrument to pursue that.

TORRICELLI: No one is promoting that anyone should use terrorist acts. It is the problem of definition and the responsibility of a citizen of a illegitimate state that is committing terrorist acts against its own people, at what point it becomes legitimate for them to take up arms, something of which we're not unfamiliar in our own national experience.

Is it by definition possible for someone to have committed an illegitimate act against the national socialist government of Germany in the 1930s? Or would any act against that government, by definition, have been legitimate?

And the question, if I were a citizen of Iran today, I believe an Iranian citizen has a responsibility to take action against the Irani government, given the abuse against their own people, the role they're playing in the world, the offense of the Iranian government against the world. That is my belief, that there is a responsibility to take action.

And I also want to just note in the record too that if this is to be the policy of the United States government, it requires consistency. What the people of Mujahedeen are doing now may or may not be legitimate; it is a subject of legitimate debate. But it also is not any different than what they were doing five years ago. When their representatives were entertained in the White House, they were meeting with U.S. government officials and a majority of the United States Congress was lending support and even suggesting funding. Same people, same organizations, same acts, leading to the legitimate suspicion that perhaps they were redefined, not because what they were doing was a terrorist act, but because the administration was sending a signal at their expense to the Iranian government of an accommodation or a reconciliation. They were, in this administration, the same gifts that in Mr. Carter's administration took the form of a birthday cake, and may have done so at enormous expense to their lives and their operations.

Much of what I have suggested may not have an answer.

TORRICELLI: They are -- I'm posing questions for you about which I may have mixed feelings myself, but nevertheless I presented them because I wanted you to think about them.

SHEEHAN: Thank you, Senator. If I could respond briefly, my office coordinates the designation of foreign terrorist organizations, and there are a lot of sensitive political issues regarding many of the groups that are either on or off of that list. But I can assure you that I have never felt any pressure from anyone within my building or within the interagency community on who should or should not be on that list. And quite frankly, I have no agenda other than who is involved in terrorism. And I am not susceptible to pressures within any part of our government to that.

In the case of the MEK, we thought they met the criteria. It was challenged in court, and it was upheld.

WATSON: Senator, I would say that's a very good issue that you raised. It also raises the Neutrality Act and the violation of federal law as to what is allowed or not allowed within the United States, to go back to -- on the country that maybe they don't disagree with or agree with.

So, very good issue, but it kicks in the Neutrality Act.

HELMS: Certainly.

Gentlemen, I regret that we kept you here so long, but it's been a remarkable session, and I appreciate your coming and putting up with the delay and all the rest of it.

Now, you know we have questions in writing from senators who were not able to be here, and maybe some from me. And if you will respond to them as quickly as you can, I would appreciate it.

If they become -- if there is no further business to come before the committee, we stand in recess.